

ARCHIVES
COMIREX-D-48

25X1A

	<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Document Number and Subject</u>	
25X1	[REDACTED] 0088-67	17 Oct 67	59	COMIREX-D-48/125, subj: Evaluation of Repetitive Photographic Mission	[REDACTED]
25X1A	[REDACTED]				25X1D
	[REDACTED] 44053-67	21 Apr 67	1	None, subj: Comments on GMAIC Mission Cable	25X1D
	[REDACTED]				
	None	6 Jan 67		None, subj: DIA Comments (on subject of COMOR-D-48/121) *	
	None	9 Jan 67		None, subj: NSA Comments *	
	None	9 Jan 67		None, subj: NRO Comments *	
25X1	[REDACTED]		1	None, subj: Cable on OPCEN Cite 2048	25X1D
	[REDACTED]				

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	<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Document Number and Subject</u>	25X1D
25X1A	[REDACTED]-4598-66/1 [REDACTED]-4598-66 USIB-D-41.15/80	1 Dec 66 25 Nov 66	45 45	None, subj: Same as Above COMOR-D-48/119, subj: Cancellation of the December KH-4 Satellite Mission	
25X1	[REDACTED]0104-66	4 Nov 66	58	COMOR-D-48/118, subj: ABM Collection Proposal from Deputy Chairman, GMAIC	25X1D
25X1A					
25X1A	[REDACTED]-56629-66	8 Oct 66	57	COMOR-D-48/116, subj: Projected Satellite Launch Schedule	25X1D
	[REDACTED]-44249-66	27 Sept 66	2	None, subj: KH-4, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Launch Schedules for FY 1967	25X1D 25X1D
	[REDACTED]-4569-66 USIB-D-41.15/79	16 Sept 66	45	COMOR-D-48/115, subj: KH-4, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Launch Schedules for FY 1967	25X1D 25X1D
25X1	[REDACTED]0091-66	1 Sept 66	57	COMOR-D-48/114, subj: GMAIC Requirement for Repetitive [REDACTED] Coverage	25X1D
25X1A	[REDACTED]56588-66	7 Jul 66	57	COMOR-D-48/113, subj: [REDACTED] Launch Program	
	[REDACTED]56583-66	29 June 66	57	COMOR-D-48/112, subj: Inclusion of Pan Geometry System in CORONA for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy	
25X1A	[REDACTED]9522-66 B-D-41.14/290	4 Apr 66	43	COMOR-D-48/111, subj: Requirement for Special Coverage of GMAIC Targets	
	[REDACTED]510-66 USIB-D-41.15/78	4 Apr 66	43	COMOR-D-48/110, subj: COMOR Evaluation of the Current Satellite Launch Program	

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-56541-66

16 Mar 66

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COMOR-D-48/109, subj: Crisis Management

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0022-66

8 Mar 66

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COMOR-D-48/108, subj: Requirement for Repetitive Coverage of Specific Targets

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-56512-66

24 Jan 66

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COMOR-D-48/107, subj: The Application of Image Forming Satellite Reconnaissance to Crisis Management

-4454-66
IB-D-41.15/75

10 Jan 66

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COMOR-D-48/106, subj: National Reconnaissance Program Satellite Launches

4760-65
IB-D-41.15/73

3 Jan 66

40

COMOR-D-48/105, subj: Same as Above

4631-65/4

17 Jun 65

38

None, subj: Plans for Use of Satellite Reconnaissance in Critical International Situations

4631-65/3

9 Jun 65

40

None, subj: Same as Above

631-65
D-41.15/72

4 Jun 65

40

COMOR-D-48/104, subj: Plans for Use of Satellite Reconnaissance in Critical International Situations

-57124-65

1 Jun 65

54

COMOR-D-48/103, subj: Same as Above

-57115-65

18 May 65

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COMOR-D-48/102, subj: Same as COMOR-D-48/104

40596-65

11 May 65

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COMOR-D-48/101, subj: Same as COMOR-D-48/104

40590-65

4 May 65

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COMOR-D-48/100, subj: Same as COMOR-D-48/104

40584-65

28 Apr 65

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COMOR-D-48/99, subj: Same as COMOR-D-48/104

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25X1	[REDACTED]-0059-65	28 Apr 65	54	COMOR-D-48/98, subj: Requirement for Continuing Specific Coverage of Soviet Submarine Force "Base-line" Targets
25X1A	[REDACTED]40574-65	12 Apr 65	54	COMOR-D-48/97, subj: Guidance for the KH-4 Mission for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
25X1	[REDACTED]4564-65	5 Apr 65	40	COMOR-D-48/96, subj: Recommendation for Special KH-4 Mission to Cover Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Requirements
25X1A	[REDACTED]-D-41.14/240			
	4560-65 B-D-41.14/239	29 Mar 65	40	COMOR-D-48/95, subj: Same as Above
	4484-65 B-D-41.15/62	8 Feb 65	40	COMOR-D-48/94, subj: Next Launch of CORONA-J
	4479-65 B-D-41.15/61	3 Feb 65	40	COMOR-D-48/93, subj: Next Launch of CORONA-J
	36421-64 B-D-41.15/55	27 Nov 64	39	COMOR-D-48/92, subj: December Launch Schedule of J Missions
	36340-64 B-D-41.15/42	14 Sept 64	24	COMOR-D-48/91, subj: Crisis Intelligence Collection Means
	36333-64 B-D-41.15/41	4 Sept 64	34	COMOR-D-48/90, subj: The Standby Crisis Satellite
	3169-64	31 Aug 64	52	COMOR-D-48/89, subj: Secondary Payloads on Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites
	3154-64	17 Aug 64	52	COMOR-D-48/88, subj: Standby Crisis Satellite
	3152-64	17 Aug 64	52	COMOR-D-48/87, subj: Secondary Payloads on Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites
	3072-64	3 Aug 64	52	COMOR-D-48/86, subj: Technical Guidance on ARGON Mission 9066A
	36337-64	8 Sept. 64	34	Addendum to COMOR-D-48/90, USCIR P-41.15/41

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<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Document Number and Subject</u>
-3160-64	22 Aug 64	52	COMOR-D-48/85/A, subj: Standby Crisis Satellite
-3034-64	24 July 64	54	COMOR-D-48/85, subj: The Standby Crisis Satellite
-3033-64	24 July 64	52	COMOR-D-48/84, subj: ARGON Mission for August 1964
-3030-64	21 July 64	3	COMOR-D-48/83, subj: The Standby Crisis Satellite
-2972-64	10 July 64	51	COMOR-D-48/82, subj: ARGON Mission for August 1964
-4574-64 B-D-41.15/38	6 July 64	34	COMOR-D-48/80, subj: Discus- sion on Satellite Reconnaissance Programming as Related to Priority for Emphasis
-2923-64	30 June 64	52	COMOR-D-48/79, subj: The Standby Crisis Satellite
-2830-64	19 June 64	51	COMOR-D-48/78, subj: Board Guidance for NRO in Management of the Next KH-4 Mission 1007-J
-4558-64 B-D-41.15/37	19 June 64	34	COMOR-D-48/77, subj: COMOR Recommendations on Scheduling for KH-4
-2914-64	22 June 64	52	COMOR-D-48/76, subj: The Standby Crisis Satellite (CWG-D-13/4)
-2825-64	15 June 64	51	COMOR-D-48/75, subj: COMOR's Recommendations on Scheduling for KH-4
None	11 June 64		

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541-64 D-41.15/36	21 May 64	34	COMOR-D-48/72, subj: Importance of Satellite Reconnaissance Coverage for Timely Production of National Intelligence Estimates
37-64 D-41.14/144	14 May 64	34	COMOR-D-48/71, subj: Priority Scheduling of China for KH-4
41-64	12 May 64	51	COMOR-D-48/70, subj: Priority Scheduling of China for KH-4: Proposal of the Navy Member
42-64	14 May 64	50	COMOR-D-48/69, subj: ARGON Photo Requirements
30-64 D-41.15/34	4 May 64	34	COMOR-D-48/68, subj: Discussion of Satellite Reconnaissance Schedule
21-64	7 Apr 64	50	COMOR-D-48/67, subj: Target Information

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4514-64 -D-41.15/33	6 Apr 64	34	COMOR-D-48/65, subj: Programming of Standby Satellite
4516-64	27 Mar 64	50	COMOR-D-48/64, subj: KH-4 Satellite Schedule for April
4507-64	18 Mar 64	1	USIB-D-41.13/7, subj: NRO Program and Plans for Improved Satellite Reconnaissance System

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2444-64 B-D-41.15/30	19 Mar 64	50	COMOR-D-48/62, subj: ARGON Photo Requirements --Revised
2442-64 B-D-41.15/31	16 Mar 64	50	COMOR-D-48/62, subj: ARGON Photo Requirements
2436-64 B-D-41.15/30	2 Mar 64	50	COMOR-D-48/60, subj: ARGON Photo Requirements
4463-64 B-D-41.15/29	29 Jan 64	34	COMOR-D-48/59, subj: Discussion of Satellite Reconnaissance Schedule
4451-64 B-D-41.15/30	6 Jan 64	34	COMOR-D-48/58, subj: Same as above
38399-63 B-D-41.15/29	30 Dec 63	34	COMOR-D-48/57, subj: Report by Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
24155-63 B-D-41.15/26	11 Dec 63	34	COMOR-D-48/55, subj: Recommendation for Additional ARGON Missions
24151-63 B-D-41.15/24	5 Dec 63	34	COMOR-D-48/54, subj: Revision of Satellite Reconnaissance Program
3686-63 B-D-41.15/25	5 Dec 63	34	COMOR-D-48/53, subj: Recommendation for Additional ARGON Missions
24145-63 B-D-41.15/22	15 Nov 63	34	COMOR-D-48/52, subj: Briefing on Satellite Reconnaissance Program

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25X1	[REDACTED]			
	2262-63 B-D-41.15/21	15 Oct 63	33	COMOR-D-48/51, subj: Withdrawal of Document from USIB Consideration
	2259-63 B-D-41.15/20	8 Oct 63	33	COMOR-D-48/50, subj: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963
	0409-63	1 Oct 63	48	COMOR-D-48/49, subj: Requirements for Satellite Photography for Search and for Technical Intelligence for FY 1965
	0403-63-KH B-D-41.15/19	26 Sept 63	33	COMOR-D-48/48, subj: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963
	0399-63-KH	24 Sept 63	48	COMOR-D-48/47, subj: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963
	2248-63 B-D-41.15/18	6 Sept 63		COMOR-D-48/46, subj: Review of Requirement for Overhead Reconnaissance of the Sino-Indian Border--changed to COMOR-D-25/52
25X1A	[REDACTED]			
25X1	[REDACTED] 3047-63-KH B-D-41.15/17	20 Sept 63	31	COMOR-D-48/45, subj: Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963
25X1	[REDACTED] 245-63 B-D-41.15/16	15 Aug 63	44	COMOR-D-48/44, subj: Review of Sensitive Collection Program
25X1A	[REDACTED]			
	4267-63 B-D-41.15/11	2 July 63	44	COMOR-D-48/39, subj: ARGON Priority
	4261-63 B-D-41.15/9	27 Jun 63	44	COMOR-D-48/37, subj: ARGON Priority
	4258-63 B-D-41.15/8	24 Jun 63	44	COMOR-D-48/36, subj: ARGON Priority
25X1	[REDACTED] 0291-63-KH	17 Jun 63	48	COMOR-D-48/35, subj: Coverage Requirements for Frame Camera of KH-6 System

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SC-06573-63 USIB-41.15/6	23 May 63	60	COMOR-D-48/33, subj: ARGON Priority
SC-05012-63 USIB-D-41.15/5	15 May 63	61	COMOR-D-48/32, subj: COMOR Recommendation Regarding ARGON Priority
SC-05010-63-KH	11 May 63	42	COMOR-D-48/31, subj: Requirement for Refinement of Timing for Satellite Reconnaissance of Tyura Tam

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[REDACTED]-4245-63 USIB-D-41.15/4	6 May 63	60	COMOR-D-48/30, subj: Relative Priority for Additional ARGON Flight
SC-05009-63-KH	2 May 63	42	COMOR-D-48/29, subj: Requirement for Refinement of Timing of Collection Against Tyura Tam

SC-05003-63-KH	16 Apr 63	42	COMOR-D-48/28, subj: Requirement for Implementing a Critical Technical Intelligence Collection Operation
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[REDACTED]			
2145-63	20 Feb 63	38	COMOR-D-48/26, subj: Satellite Programming Procedures
2144-63	20 Feb 63	38	COMOR-D-48/25, subj: LANYARD Target List
4222-63 B-D-41.14/9	12 Feb 63	18	COMOR-D-48/24, subj: Resumption of the ARGON Program
[REDACTED] 202-63-KH 3-D-41.14/8	7 Feb 63	29	COMOR-D-48/23, subj: Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance

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140-63/A	5 Feb 63	38	COMOR-D-48/22, subj: Requirements for the First LANYARD Mission
221-63 -D-41.14/7	11 Feb 63	18	COMOR-D-48/21, subj: Satellite Reconnaissance Scheduling(Final)
018-63 -D-41.14/7	4 Feb 63	37	COMOR-D-48/21, subj: COMOR Recommendation on Satellite Scheduling
018-63/A -D-41.14/7	22 Jan 63	30	COMOR-D-48/21, subj: Tab A --COMOR Proposed Revision of the NRO Schedule
214-63 -D-41.15/2	28 Jan 63	39	COMOR-D-48/19, subj: Resumption of ARGON Program
206-63 -D-41.15/1	16 Jan 63	39	COMOR-D-48/18, subj: Resumption of ARGON Program
0017-62 -D-41.5/45	26 Dec 62	36	COMOR-D-48/17, subj: Resumption of ARGON Program
583-62 -D-41.5/35	7 Nov 62	36	COMOR-D-48/16, subj: NRP Satellite Schedule
562-62 -41.5/34	29 Oct 62	31	COMOR-D-48/15, subj: NRP (Satellite) Schedule
536-62 -D-41.5/32	25 Oct 62	31	COMOR-D-48/14, subj: NRP (Satellite) Schedule
3834-62-KH	22 Oct 62	49	25X1A COMOR-D-48/13, subj: Scheduling of ARGON, CORONA, [redacted] and 201
3807-62-KH -D-41.5/30	11 Oct 62	45	COMOR-D-48/12, subj: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

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[redacted]	3834-62-KH	22 Oct 62	49	COMOR-D-48/13, subj: Scheduling of ARGON, CORONA, [redacted] and 201
[redacted]	3807-62-KH -D-41.5/30	11 Oct 62	45	COMOR-D-48/12, subj: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

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<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Document Number and Subject</u>
	28 Sept 62	33	COMOR-D-48/11, subj: NRP Satellite Schedule
	18 Sept 62	31	COMOR-D-48/10, subj: NRP (Satellite) Schedule
	5 Sept 62	30	COMOR-D-48/9, subj: CORONA Coverage of the ABM Installations on Kamchatka
	13 Aug 62	31	COMOR-D-48/8, subj: ARGON Scheduling
	27 Jul 62	31	COMOR-D-48/7, subj: Evaluation of the First ARGON Mission and Proposed Future Schedule
	27 Jun 62	31	COMOR-D-48/6, subj: Same as Above
	18 Jun 62	33	COMOR-D-48/5, subj: Same as Above
	19 Mar 62	28	COMOR-D-48/4, subj: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions: Conclusion
	27 Feb 62	28	COMOR-D-48/3, subj: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions
	13 Feb 62	28	COMOR-D-48/2, subj: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions
	26 Sept 61	28	COMOR-D-48/1, subj: Scheduling of Satellite Photography
	5 Sept 61	30	COMOR-D-48, subj: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions

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22 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Standby Crisis Satellite

REFERENCE: COMOR-D-48/85, [] 3034-64

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Attached for further consideration by COMOR at its meeting of 27 August is a draft of the conclusions and recommendations for the subject paper which resulted from the discussion at the meeting of COMOR on 20 August (see COMOR-M-261, para 16).

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[]
James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment

Conclusion and Recommendation paragraphs suggested for ref

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4	DIA ([])
5, 6, 7, 8	DIA TCO
9	OACSI TCO
10, 11	ONI TCO
12, 13, 14, 15	AFNIN TCO
16, 17	NSA TCO
18, 19, 20	NRO TCO

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12. Conclusions:

- a. That the KH-4 is not an effective vehicle for crisis situations.

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development of a reliability comparable to that now pertaining to KH-4, it is considered necessary to also have on R -7 standby for crisis needs a KH-4, fully recognizing as the foregoing discussion indicates, its limitations. This conclusion recognizes that in a crisis all of the available assets of the Government will probably be needed to ascertain the military posture of the Soviets.

13. Recommendation: That the Board

- a. Note the discussion of this paper indicating the shortcomings of KH-4 as a means of determining the military posture of the Soviets in a crisis situation.

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
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c. Request the NRO for the time being and until further notice from the Board continue to hold available an R - 7 KH-4 for crisis situations.

d. Request COMOR to continue its advice to the NRO on the targeting necessary to program [redacted] a KH-4 R-7 [redacted] for crisis situation reconnaissance.

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24 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite

1. Attached for the information and reference of COMOR is a memorandum on the above subject approved at the meeting of 23 July (see COMOR-M-253, para 8).

2. By this publication, the attachment is officially transmitted to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. It is also transmitted to the Director, National Indications Center for his information and with the request that he provide to the COMOR by 15 August his comments so that the Committee may take them into account in further consideration of the matter.

3. It is anticipated that, after receipt of the views of the Director, National Reconnaissance and of the Director, National Indications Center, COMOR may then wish to assign the Photo Working Group the task of determining the specific targets discussed generally in paragraphs 6 through 11.



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James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment

Memo for D/NRO and D/NIC

Copies 2, 3 State TCO
4, 5 DIA (for D/NIC)

6 DIA [redacted]
7, 8, 9, 10 DIA [redacted]

11 OACSI TCO

12, 13 ONI TCO

14, 15, 16, 17 AFNIN TCO

18, 19 NSA TCO

20, 21, 22 SAESS TCO

CORONA [redacted]

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COMOR-D-48/85

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24 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Director, National Indications Center

SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.14/7 (COMOR-D-48/21), 11Feb63

1. On 11 February 1963 (see reference, para 8b), the USIB requested that the NRO investigate the possibility of developing a standby satellite reconnaissance capability for use in crisis situations. This capability was to include provision for immediate replacement of vehicles fired and a means for these vehicles taking priority over other firings in the U.S. satellite schedule. Targets were to be the type of targets designated as possible indicators and were to be relatively few in number and programming was to be tailored to cover a broad and representative sample of targets and as many as possible during each day's orbit.

2. In response to this request, the NRO has programmed KH-4 vehicles against indications targets and placed them in standby status. Because seven days are required between the request for launch and actual firing, these KH-4 vehicles have become known as R minus 7 (R - 7) standbys, the only satellite system specifically programmed against indications targets.

3. In the course of the discussion of this system over the 18 months, there has been a recognition that, because of the time required for response (alert, launch, collection, recovery, and read-out), satellite photography cannot be thought of as a collector of early-warning information. The term "indications" has, although erroneously used, been generally used to identify the purpose of this capability. COMOR believes that a more accurate term, such as crisis situation, should be adopted.

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COMOR-D-48/85

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
4. We conceive a crisis situation as a period of international tension of some duration and recognized as such by higher authority. Normally, we may expect a crisis situation to occur without warning. However, a crisis could be provoked by action initiated by the U.S.* and be followed by reactions on the part of the USSR. In such an event, the objective is to monitor the military posture of the USSR during a specified period after the U.S. action. In the event of an unpredictable crisis, because of the slow reaction time of the R - 7, the need is to be able to estimate the posture two weeks hence. It is, therefore, necessary to choose targets which could be valid in this time frame, as outlined in paragraphs 6 through 11. A need to determine that posture in a time period of less than two weeks (the interval required to launch and acquire information) cannot at this time be considered a part of this problem. In addition, it is recognized that there may be a need to further assess that posture and changes in it at intervals but such intervals could not now under present capabilities be less than one week.

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6. When looked at in the light of the need for coverage of an unpredictable crisis, rather than either of the special situations covered in paragraphs 4 and 5, COMOR examined what the various military developments are which, if photographed, could usefully contribute to the assessment of the military posture of the USSR or changes therein. It concluded that these were the movement of ground forces, the deployment of submarines, increased activity suggesting removal of special weapons from regional stockpiles, and the readiness of the

*Such as was the case in Cuba in October, 1962.



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
CORONA / [redacted]

COMOR-D-48/85

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MRBM/IRBM force. It also considered whether the long-range air force and the ICBM should be included. While they should be included, the time period between request for launch and the date of readout is much too long to show status since the time lapses between decision to ready these types of weapons systems and actual commitment is measured in hours--not days.

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COMOR-D-48/85

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11. It would, of course, be possible and prudent to target points of interest pertinent to other types of military threat but not with the anticipation that information of value in determining an ominous change in posture would likely be forthcoming.

12. Conclusions

a. The KH-4 is not an effective vehicle for


crisis situations.

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[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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COMOR-D-48/84

24 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: ARGON Mission for August 1964

Attached for the information and reference of COMOR is a memorandum approved at the COMOR meeting of 23 July 1964 (see COMOR-M-253, para 10). By this publication, it is also officially transmitted to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office.

[redacted]
James R. Rosen

Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachment

Memo for D/NRO

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COMOR-D-48/84

24 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office
SUBJECT: ARGON Mission for August 1964
REFERENCE: USIB-D-41, 15/26 (COMOR-D-48/55), 11Dec63


1. At its meeting on 11 December, the Board instructed that the National Reconnaissance Office should take appropriate action to schedule three additional ARGON missions for 1964 beginning at the earliest date in the summer, the number of missions to be flown to be dependent upon COMOR's review of each mission to ascertain whether subsequent missions are necessary (see reference).

2. When ARGON Mission 9065A was returned, the AMS at the earliest possible time examined the results of that mission. At the COMOR meeting of today, the DIA, in coordination with the military services, presented the findings on that mission and advised with regard to future missions.

3. In the light of that report, COMOR concluded as follows:

a. There is sufficient evidence from the preliminary review of the material to show that, because of extensive cloud coverage in Mission 9065A and in terms of the area remaining to be covered against which that mission was directed, there is a clear need for an additional mission in August 1964.

b. That, accordingly, COMOR advises the NRO of this conclusion and recommends that it initiate action as necessary to program a mission as soon as possible, preferably by mid-August, inasmuch as climatic



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COMOR-D-48/84

and light conditions for these purposes become marginal
later on.

c. That DIA, at the request of COMOR should
immediately act to provide the NRO additional guidance
derived from the review of 9065A for programming the next
mission.

[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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 35, 36 CIA COMOR Member
 37 CGS ReqBr/ReconGrp
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 39 AD/SI
 40 DDP TCO
 41 DDS&T TCO [redacted]
 42 C/Action/DDS&T [redacted]
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Control System Only CORONA [redacted] SA (CCOR) / DDS&T
COMOR-D-48/83 25X1A

21 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite

1. Attached for the consideration of the COMOR at its meeting on 23 July is a revision of COMOR-D-48/79 which takes into account the discussion at its meeting on 16 July (see COMOR-M-252, paragraphs 7 and 8). COMOR will note that paragraphs 4 and 5 are designed to directly speak to the questions raised by [redacted] at the reference meeting.

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2. It is proposed that COMOR at its 23 July meeting approve this document as they wish to amend it and forward it to the NRO. At the same time it is proposed to forward this paper to the NIC requesting its specific comment within two weeks of the time of receipt on paragraphs 4 through 8.

3. It is recognized that once COMOR receives the views of the NIC, if indeed NIC desires to submit such, there then remains a task for the PWG to determine the targeting discussed generally in paragraphs 4 through 8.



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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment: Subject paper.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite
REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.14/7 (COMOR-D-48/21) 11 Feb 63

1. On 11 February 1963 (see ref. para. 8b), the USIB requested that the NRO investigate the possibility of developing a standby satellite reconnaissance capability for use in crisis situations. This capability was to include provision for immediate replacement of vehicles fired and a means for these vehicles taking priority over other firings in the U.S. satellite schedule. Targets were to be the type of targets designated as possible indicators, and were to be relatively few in number and programming was to be tailored to cover a broad and representative sample of targets and as many as possible during each day's orbit.

2. In response to this request the NRO has programmed KH-4 vehicles against indications targets and placed them in standby status. Because seven days are required between the request for launch and actual firing, these KH-4 vehicles have become known as R minus 7 (R - 7) standbys, the only satellite system specifically programmed against indications targets.

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
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3. In the course of the discussion of this system over the eighteen months there has been a recognition that because of the time required for response (alert, launch, collection, recovery, and readout), satellite photography cannot be thought of as a collector of early-warning information. The term "indications" has, although erroneously used, been generally used to identify the purpose of this capability. COMOR believes that a more accurate term, such as crisis situation, should be adopted.

4. We conceive a crisis situation as a period of international tension of some duration and recognized as such by higher authority. Normally we may expect a crisis situation to occur without warning, however, a crisis could be provoked by pre-emptive action by the United States and be followed by expected reactions on the part of the USSR. In such an event, the objective is to monitor the military posture of the USSR during a specified period after the pre-emptive action. In the event of an unpredictable crisis, because of the slow reaction time of the R - 7, the need is to estimate the posture two weeks hence. It is therefore, necessary to choose targets which could be valid in this time space, as outlined in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. A need to determine that posture in a time period less than two weeks (the interval required to launch and acquire information) cannot at this time be considered a part of this



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
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COMOR-D-48/83

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problem. In addition, it is recognized there may be a need to further assess that posture and changes in it at intervals but such intervals could not now under present capabilities be less than one week.

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6. When looked at in the light of the need for coverage of an unpredictable crisis, rather than either of the special situations covered in paragraphs 4 and 5, COMOR examined what the various military developments are which, if photographed, could usefully contribute to the assessment of the military posture of the USSR or changes therein. It concluded that these were the movement of ground forces, the deployment of submarines, removal of special weapons from regional stockpiles, and the readiness of the MRBM/IRBM force. It also considered whether the

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
COMOR-D-48/82

10 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: ARGON Mission for August 1964

The attached memorandum is forwarded as a matter of record. As you will remember, the approval of COMOR was tentative depending on a telephone call from [redacted] DIA. He has now requested that no action be initiated until the AMS preliminary report has been studied by DIA. This should be accomplished early enough in the week to meet the 15 July deadline with NRO. The initiative for concluding action on this matter rests with DIA.

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James Q. Keeler

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:

Subject memo.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: ARGON Mission for August 1964

1. At its meeting on 2 July, COMOR was advised of the fact that the factory was loaded with the results of 1007 and 9065A as well as with other material and that, accordingly, there would be delay in making 9065A material available to AMS (see COMOR-M-250, para 13). COMOR emphasized the importance of obtaining the results of the material from 9065A promptly in order to make the appraisal required by USIB action (see USIB-D-41.15/26; COMOR-D-48/55) in order to determine whether an additional A (which is available) should be used during August 1964, this being the last capability planned for possible use during 1964.

2. Taking into account the report made to COMOR at its meeting on 9 July regarding the preliminary estimate of cloud coverage on 9065A and the fact that AMS expects to have a preliminary evaluation by 11 July, COMOR concluded as follows:

a. That there is sufficient evidence from the preliminary take of the material at the factory to

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
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show that there was extensive cloud coverage and that in terms of the areas remaining to be covered against which 9065A was directed, the need is clear for an additional mission in August.

b. That, accordingly, COMOR advises the NRO of this conclusion and recommends that it initiate action as necessary to program a mission as soon as possible, preferably by mid-August, inasmuch as climatic and light conditions for these purposes become marginal later on.

c. That DIA, at the request of COMOR should upon receiving the report on the readout by the AMS on 15 July, immediately act to provide the NRO additional guidance derived from that report for programming the next mission.



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USIB-D-41.15/38
(COMOR-D-48/80)
6 July 1964
Limited Distribution

U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T E L L I G E N C E B O A R D

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Discussion on Satellite Reconnaissance Programming
as Related to Priority for Emphasis

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.19/3 (COMOR-D-72/3), 25 June 1964,
Limited Distribution

1. In restricted session at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 1 July, the Acting Chairman read a DIA-suggested addition to paragraph 3. of the Reference which dealt with the possibility of emphasis of China coverage in the programming of 1009-J in the event coverage of China by 1007-J proved inadequate.

2. The Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), pointed out that apart from the wording of the referenced USIB record of action, 25X1D there were a number of points to be considered by the Board regarding the



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(COMOR-D-48/80)
6 July 1964

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4. The Chairman, COMOR, asked if the Board concurred in emphasis on the USSR for 1008-J and 1009-J, with second priority for China. The Acting DIA Member said he understood last week that USIB had agreed that if usable China coverage by 1007-J proved inadequate, this factor could be programmed into 1009-J. General Fitch pointed out that the Saturday review by COMOR of the take from the second bucket of 1007-J might indicate that some missed China coverage be programmed into 1008-J and more heavily into 1009-J. The DD/NRO indicated that while a totally new program could not be cut for 1008-J, minor adjustments to the existing programs could be made while 1008-J is in orbit and film would be available for high priority targets in China. He indicated that the results of readout of 1007-J could be reflected in the programming for 1009-J, which would probably be scheduled during the last week in July.

5. General Fitch stressed the need to cover [REDACTED] China. 25X2
Mr. Reber noted the concern for coverage of [REDACTED] holidays in the USSR. Noting the bad weather over China, he cautioned that if primary emphasis were placed on China, this could involve commitments which would prevent getting good cover of the USSR during the favorable light period.

6. The Acting Chairman pointed out that we are faced with the need for new baseline coverage of all of the USSR in connection with the search for single silos. The Acting DIA Member, while indicating that he couldn't agree

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USIB-D-41.15/38
(COMOR-D-48/80)
6 July 1964
Limited Distribution

with the need for new baseline photography of the USSR without further study, again pointed out the need for high priority coverage of China. The Acting Chairman said he would place less emphasis on China over the next two months when light conditions are best and weather is better over the USSR. In view of the fact that the NRO will cut two programs, one emphasizing USSR and one China, Mr. Reber proposed that COMOR recommend to the Board a preference shortly before 1009 is scheduled, in time to meet the NRO deadline.

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8. In response to a question regarding implications of recent remarks by Khrushchev about overflights of Cuba, General Carter said that he was having a paper on that subject brought up-to-date. He also stated that Mr. McGeorge Bundy had indicated he wished to discuss Cuban surveillance at the 303 Committee meeting on Thursday. In view of the previously stated USIB position on this subject, the Acting Chairman indicated he would strongly support the continuing USIB requirement for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba. General Fitch said that Defense supports that position completely. In this connection, the Chairman, COMOR, recalled that as reported in USIB-D-41.14/138 (COMOR-D-24/138) and the Addendum thereto, the Board, while affirming the need for U-2 coverage of Cuba in view of the inadequacy of alternate means, had noted some possibilities for the use of drones and balloons which had been mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof.

9. In summary, USIB:

a. Accepted the suggested amendment to paragraph 3. of the Reference by the DD/NRO. (This amendment is being incorporated in a revised version of the Reference.)

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USIB-D-41, 15/38
(COMOR-D-48/80)
6 July 1964
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b. Agreed that the program for 1008-J should emphasize coverage of the USSR, but that an effort be made also to accomodate high priority China targets missed by 1007-J.

c. Agreed that USIB would not object to an operational decision being made by NRO to use the Zombie Mode for the second bucket of 1008-J if such adverse weather exists after recovery of the first bucket that this mode might provide a prospect of increased useful photography and operational conditions permit this action, subject to clearance with the DCI of the final decision whether to use Zombie.

d. Noted that, under the current schedule for launch of 1009-J probably during the last week of July, it would be possible for COMOR to report back to USIB on the priority emphasis recommended for 1009-J.

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f. Concurred in the continued strong support by the Acting Chairman of the USIB requirement for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba, including U-2 coverage.

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[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

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COMOR-D-48/79

30 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite
REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.14/7 (COMOR-D-48/21), 11 Feb 63

1. In pursuance of the discussion of the above subject at the last meeting of COMOR (see COMOR-M-249, para 9), the Chairman with the cooperation of [redacted] prepared the attached redraft for further consideration of the above subject by COMOR.

2. It should be noted that this subject is an item on the agenda for the COMOR meeting of 2 July 1964.

[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment
Subject draft

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COMOR-D-48/79

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite
REFERENCE: USIB-D-41, 14/7 (COMOR-D-48/21), 11 Feb 63

1. On 11 February 1963 (see ref, para 8b), the USIB requested that the NRO investigate the possibility of developing a standby satellite reconnaissance capability for use in crisis situations. This capability was to include provision for immediate replacement of vehicles fired and a means for these vehicles taking priority over other firings in the U. S. satellite schedule. Targets were to be relatively few in number and programming was to be tailored to cover a broad and representative sample of targets and as many as possible during each day's orbit.

2. In response to this request the NRO has programmed KH-4 vehicles against indications targets and placed them in standby status. Because seven days are required between the request for launch and actual firing, these KH-4 vehicles have become known as R minus 7 (R -7) standbys, the only satellite systems specifically programmed against indications targets.

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
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COMOR-D-48/79

3. In the course of the discussion of this system over the 18 months there has been a recognition that because of the time required for response (alert, launch, collection, recovery, and readout), satellite photography cannot be thought of as a collector of early-warning information. The term "indications" has, however, been generally used to identify the purpose of this capability. COMOR believes that a more accurate term should be adopted. e. a crisis period of tension

4. We conceive a crisis as a period of international tension of some duration and recognized as such by higher authority. At such a time, it is anticipated that, apart from the existing capabilities of the United States Government for collection of early-warning indications, there would be a need to assess what direction the military posture of the USSR is taking and to estimate its position two weeks hence. In addition, there may be a need to assess further that posture and changes in it at perhaps weekly intervals. When looked at in this light, COMOR examined what the various military developments are which, if photographed, could usefully contribute to the assessment of the military posture of the USSR or changes therein. It concluded that these were the movement of ground forces, the deployment of submarines, removal of special weapons from



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COMOR-D-48/79

regional stockpiles, and the readiness of the MRBM/IRBM force. It also considered whether the long-range air force and the ICBM should be included. They were rejected because the time period between request for launch and date of readout was much too long to show status since the time lapses between decision to ready these types of weapons systems and actual commitment is measured in hours--not days.

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COMOR-D-48/79

11. Recommendation: That the NRO be requested to advise on
the possibility of employing [redacted] a KH-4 as a crisis satellite 25X1A
as an interim until near real-time reconnaissance systems become
available.

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COMOR-D-48/79

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35 ,36 CIA COMOR Member
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COMOR-D-48/78

19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Board Guidance for NRO in Management
of the Next KH-4 Mission 1007-J

1. Attached for the information and reference of COMOR is a memorandum prepared by COMOR at its 18 June meeting (see COMOR-M-247, para 8). The Chairman/COMOR discussed this matter with the Chairman/USIB on the morning of 19 June. The latter confirmed that the priority set forth in paragraph 1 a through 1 e of the attached paper was in keeping with the Board's decision at the meeting of the Board on 17 June, and that the NRO should be so instructed.

2. The Chairman advised [redacted] of NRO of this instruction by telephone on the morning of 19 June. This oral instruction is confirmed by the publication of this document.

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[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachment:

Subject paper.

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9 OACSI TCO
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COMOR-D-48/78

18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Board Guidance for NRO in Management
of the Next KH-4 Mission 1007-J

1. At its meeting today the COMOR was advised by the NRO representative that NRO intended, in pursuance of the Board meeting of 17 June, to manage the collection of photography in 1007-J in the following manner.

- a. Highest priority targets in the USSR and highest priority targets in China.
- b. Other point targets in China and North Korea.
- c. Holidays in China and North Korea.
- d. Other point targets in the USSR and European satellites (excluding Yugoslavia).
- e. Holidays in the USSR and European satellites (excluding Yugoslavia).

2. The NRO representative requested COMOR for clarification as to whether this was COMOR's understanding of the intention of the Board.

3. In view of the interest expressed at the Board with regard to the need for coverage of the USSR in the light of both the four-month gap in coverage, the discovery of the single silos and concern about the deployment of those silos, and concern for the current information to be used in the preparation of the NIE 11 series, COMOR felt that this order of priority should be altered as follows:

- a. Highest priority targets in the USSR and highest priority targets in China.



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- b. Other point targets in the USSR and European satellites (excluding Yugoslavia).
- c. Holidays in the USSR and European satellites (excluding Yugoslavia).
- d. Other point targets in China and North Korea.
- e. Holidays in China and North Korea.

4. For your convenience in considering this problem there is attached the present highest priority targets in the USSR and China which will probably change somewhat by COMOR's review of these targets in the light of the results of 1006-J-2.


5. Recommendation: In view of the uncertainty revealed by the discussion above, recommend that you indicate to the NRO whether it is the Board's intention to proceed as indicated in paragraph one above or in paragraph three.

signed

James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:

Target List (w/orig only)



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
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USIB-D-41.15/37
(COMOR-D-48/77)
19 June 1964
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : COMOR Recommendations on Scheduling for KH-4
REFERENCE : COMOR-D-48/75, 15 June 1964

1. In restricted session at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 17 June, the Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), introduced the referenced memorandum on the subject by noting the disagreement on paragraph 6.a. He explained that the issue was whether 1007-J should be delayed so that COMOR could retarget and if necessary the NRO could reprogram 1007-J. Mr. Reber noted that, if reprogramming was required, it would take at least until July 6.

2. The Chairman suggested that a "leap frog" system be used to fill the voids in photography caused by weather or other factors. By this method, Mr. McCone stated, the voids discovered after analysis of photography from 1006-J, could be retargeted for programming 1008-J. This would permit the intervening mission, 1007-J, to proceed as scheduled without the delay explained previously by the Chairman, COMOR.

3. After a brief explanation regarding the difference in "retargeting" and "reprogramming", the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DD/NRO) announced that the scheduled launch date for 1007-J had been slipped by one day from 18 June to 19 June. It was his understanding that this additional day could allow retargeting by the Photo Working Group based on 1006 results. The DIA Member noted that if 1007-J was delayed for retargeting alone, it would have to wait until 26 June. This would be not just a delay but in effect scrubbing a mission, because another J would be available 2 July.

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USIB-D-41.15/37

(COMOR-D-48/77)

19 June 1964

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4. The Chairman proposed, in keeping with his suggestion in paragraph 2 above, that 1007-J be launched as presently scheduled on 19 June; the NRO launch one J in early July and another later in July. In response to questions by the DCI, the DD/NRO stated that the emphasis on China would be retained in the 1007-J program and a weather satellite to be launched 18 June should give better weather prediction than that available for 1006-J with a resultant better use of film. [] stated that he would like to correct a statement he had made at the 10 June USIB meeting concerning the percentage of film expended for China coverage by 1006-J. The DD/NRO stated that 45 per cent of the first bucket had been expended over China, of which about half had resulted in a useful product. Of the film of the second bucket, 30-35 per cent had been expended over China. This ratio of cloud cover is about average without weather satellite information.

5. The DIA Member indicated that he subscribed to getting 1007-J off as soon as possible. General Carroll pointed out, however, that the Board might wish to reconsider the high priority given to China coverage by 1007-J, in view of the requirement for inputs on the USSR to estimates due 1 October, and due to a new urgency for Soviet coverage created by discovery of the

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[] The DIA Member pointed out that we have a new search problem on our hands involving not only all 18 known missile complexes, but also to see if there were any new suspect areas. Mr. McCone agreed to this new requirement for Soviet coverage, but stated that in view of previous commitments for China coverage, he would prefer not to change priorities on 1007-J at this late date. He said that the Board could then make its own judgment as to what priorities should be programmed for 1008-J. The DD/NRO explained that one of the two alternate programs available for 1007 would permit maximum coverage of China as well as all highest priority targets in the USSR including the missile belt, weather permitting.

6. General Carroll pointed out that, when he had argued for priority coverage of China, he had asked that it not compete with Soviet coverage. He said that his concern on this point had been heightened by the [] To meet this point as suggested by Mr. Reber, the DD/NRO proposed that paragraph 6. b. of the COMOR recommendation

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USIB-D-41.15/37
(COMOR-D-48/77)
19 June 1964
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be modified as follows: after the words "without sacrifice of coverage of" add the words "highest priority targets of". The Chairman agreed and the Board concurred with this amendment. The DIA Member emphasized that existing missile complexes should be covered first, followed by a search elsewhere.

7. In response to a question regarding the current satellite launch schedule, the DD/NRO furnished the following information:

The launch schedule as of 17 June is as follows:

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] J J J J J J

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J J J (J) (J) (J)

[REDACTED] (J) (A)

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Wx (M) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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() Available for
launch if required

Changes since the 9 June report are:

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1006	J	Second recovery successful 12 June.
9065A	A	Successfully launched 13 June.

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USIB-D-41.15/37
(COMOR-D-48/77)
19 June 1964
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<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Wx	417	Countdown scrubbed on 17 June due to fuel vent valve leak. Re- scheduled to 18 June.
1007	J	[REDACTED]

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8. After further discussion on the subject, USIB took the following action:

- a. Agreed that 1007-J should be launched as soon as possible.
*per a/c
JULY*
- b. Agreed that on 1007-J, the NRO be requested to obtain maximum coverage of China without sacrifice of coverage of highest priority targets of the USSR and its European satellites taking advantage of the weather.
- c. Concurred with the Chairman's proposal to use for the time being a "leap frog" system of CORONA-J programming, in which the information gained from the recovery of one mission would be used as a basis for programming targets for the second succeeding mission (e.g., the information received from 1006-J would be used as a basis for programming 1008-J, etc.)
- d. Noted the NRO launch schedule contained in paragraph 7 above.

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Executive Secretary

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COMOR-D-48/76
(CWG-D-13/4)

22 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.14/7(COMOR-D-48/21), 11 Feb 63

Attached for the consideration of COMOR at its meeting on 25 June is a draft memorandum to the Board on the above subject prepared by the COMOR Photo Working Group. This is responsive to the COMOR request to the PWG on 11 June 1964 (see COMOR-M-245, para 3 b.).

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[Redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject paper

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COMOR-D-48/76
(CWG-D-13/4)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: The Standby Crisis Satellite


1. On 11 February 1963 (see ref, para 8b) the USIB requested that the NRO investigate the possibility of developing a standby satellite reconnaissance capability for use in crisis situations. This capability was to include provision for immediate replacement of vehicles fired and a means for these vehicles taking priority over other firings in the U. S. satellite schedule. Targets were to be relatively few in number and programming was to be tailored to cover a broad and representative sample of targets and as many as possible during each day's orbit.

2. In response to this request the NRO has programmed KH-4 vehicles against indications targets and placed them in standby status. Because seven days are required between the request for launch and actual firing, these KH-4 vehicles have become known as R minus 7 (R - 7) standbys, the only satellite systems specifically programmed against indications targets. However, these vehicles are unsuitable for early-warning purposes; they are better suited as collectors of information which, in conjunction with collateral, may produce evidence of gradual mobilization or a check on enemy posture during a period of international tension.

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(CWG-D-13/4)

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40 DDP TCO
41 DDS&T TCO
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COMOR-D-48/75

15 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: COMOR's Recommendations
on Scheduling for KH-4

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for COMOR's advice on the next KH-4 launch. In addition, COMOR has been advised through the DDCI of your concern regarding maximizing satellite coverage of the USSR in order to be best prepared for the updating of the NIE II series which is scheduled to be completed about 1 October 1964.

2. In responding, COMOR has taken into account the preliminary results of the last KH-4 (1006) and the weather prediction capability. The two OAK reports coming from the first bucket were reviewed as was the extent to which highest priority targets were covered with interpretable photography, either completely or in part, and the measure of success over China. NRO briefed COMOR on the weather prediction capability with particular emphasis on the weather satellite contribution.

3. With regard to the coverage of USSR, COMOR is concerned by the information which has emerged since the last successful KH-4 mission in February (1004) in regard to the changes that have taken place at [redacted]

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4. In attempting to meet the Board's recommendations of 4 May (USIB-D-41, 15/34; COMOR-D-48/68), NRO expended a considerable amount of film over China under adverse weather conditions.

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COMOR-D-48/75

COMOR notes that the weather for China is expected to be poor for the immediate future. COMOR reaffirms the priority need for the coverage of China and again endorses the plan expressed in USIB-D-41.14/144 (COMOR-D-48/71). This plan called for NRO to make maximum use of the weather information and to use the remainder of the film elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The latter consideration is especially important in view of the need to obtain optimum information in support of NIE 11-8 and 11-3 (USIB-D-41.15/36; COMOR-D-48/72).

5. COMOR has been advised by the NRO that it is at present counting for launch of Mission 1007 for 18 June, and that this mission can be held until approximately 1 July. Furthermore, it may be that after COMOR's current retargeting, the two present programs available for use with 1007, would still be adequate without reprogramming. In that event in the case of 1007 as far as NRO is concerned, it could launch within four days after a report from COMOR. However, if the retargeting is of such a nature as to require reprogramming, 12 to 14 days to reprogram and launch would be required.

6. Recommendations: In the light of the needs for the NIEs and for coverage of China, taking into account the information obtained thus far from 1006, COMOR recommends:

a. That the next launch should be carried out as soon as retargeting has been accomplished. (If retargeting does not require reprogramming, the mission could be launched as early as 26 June. If the NRO must reprogram, the earliest date would be 6 July*)

b. That the NRO be requested to obtain maximum coverage of China without sacrifice of coverage of the USSR and its European satellites taking advantage of the weather.

c. That the NRO be requested to prepare itself to be able to launch successive J missions during the next 90 days as rapidly as COMOR can retarget.

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*DIA recommends that while 1007 should take into account the results of 1006-1 and -2, 1007 should be launched without reprogramming and as soon as possible.

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d. The COMOR will advise the Board if after retargeting or at any other point, it considers that there should be a delay in further launches.

[redacted]

James Q. Ruber [redacted]
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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1630, 17 Sep 64

Maxine,

After you have confirmed my notes on this paper,
will you file it in the COMOR General file.

TMS

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COMOR-D-56/36

48/75

7 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Priority Procedures for Programming [redacted]

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In connection with a discussion on the above subject at the meeting of COMOR on 7 May (see COMOR-M-238, para 14), the Chairman indicated his concern on whether, for lack of the nominal ephemeris, the COMOR and the PWG could give adequate guidance for the maximum effective collection [redacted]. He tabled the attached draft for consideration of the COMOR. It was agreed to put this on the agenda for the next meeting on 14 May.

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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37	CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
38	AD/SI
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USIB-D-41.15/36
(COMOR-D-48/72)
21 May 1964
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Importance of Satellite Reconnaissance Coverage for Timely Production of National Intelligence Estimates

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41.15/34 (COMOR-D-48/68)
4 May 1964, Limited Distribution
b. Addendum to USIB-D-41.15/34 (COMOR-D-48/68), 8 May 1964, Limited Distribution

1. In a restricted session at the 20 May United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting, the Chairman read to the Board a letter from General Carroll regarding the request by the Secretary of Defense that revised NIE 11-8 and NIE 11-3 be available on 1 October (copy attached).

2. Mr. McCone thought that this proposed schedule was quite satisfactory but pointed out the problem of producing these estimates by the dates requested in view of the recent failures of CORONA-J satellite vehicles. He noted that, while it had been planned to launch two J's in May and two in June, the next J scheduled was for launch 28 May.

3. The Chairman said that he wished to emphasize to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) the impossibility of proceeding with the production of these important estimates without results of further CORONA-J coverage. Mr. McCone stated that, unless the NRO organization can come closer to meeting USIB requirements for the intelligence inventory, something would have to be done about the NRO itself. He said that he would have to respond to Secretary McNamara that, if NRO failed to obtain the necessary satellite photographic coverage in time, USIB would be unable to meet the requested NIE schedules.

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USIB-D-41.15/36
(COMOR-D-48/72)
21 May 1964
Limited Distribution

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4. The Chairman asked the DD/NRO to check with Dr. McMillan as to when he would let the Board know the reasons for the recent failures and what can be done to correct them. Mr. McCone stressed that, while [redacted] J search coverage was essential. He again noted that, as reported Reference b., his discussions with the Secretary of Defense resulted in an agreement that there should be two J's per month, but a month is going by without such coverage.

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5. [redacted] explained that the reason for the delay was the desire by NRO to be sure that everything possible had been done to correct the causes of recent failures. The DD/NRO said that he fully appreciated the concern of USIB as expressed by the Chairman.

6. Admiral Taylor commented that, while he appreciated the need of the Secretary of Defense for the requested NIE's by 1 October, there was also increased difficulty in obtaining the necessary information regarding the Soviet submarine building program in time for these estimates. He cautioned that it might be necessary to issue a memorandum to holders after the estimates had been produced if the information on the submarine building program could not be obtained in time.

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[redacted]
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Attachment

USIB-D-41.15/36

(COMOR-D-48/72)

21 May 1964

Limited Distribution

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington 25, D. C.

S-173/AP-2B

11 May 1964

Honorable John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. McCone:

The Secretary of Defense has requested that revised NIE's on "Soviet Capabilities Thru 1970 for Strategic Attack" and "Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Thru 1970" be available on 1 October.

The latest schedule of the Board of National Estimates which I have received indicates that NIE 11-8 is scheduled for mid-September 1964 and that NIE 11-3 is scheduled for 1 July 1964. It appears then that there will be no scheduling problem in satisfying Mr. McNamara's requirements with the possible exception that a Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-3 may be in order for USIB consideration in late September.

This request is passed to you for your information in connection with scheduling priorities. If any difficulty arises which would appear to preclude fulfillment of this request, I would appreciate being advised by the Board of National Estimates.

Sincerely,

/ s/

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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SA (COMOR)/DDS&T

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CORONA

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USIB-D-41.14/144
(COMOR-D-48/71)
14 May 1964
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Priority Scheduling of China for KH-4

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/34 (COMOR-D-48/68), 4 May 1964,
Limited Distribution

1. As a result of the Board's action at its meeting of 29 April (see USIB-D-41.15/34; COMOR-D-48/68), the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) has discussed with the National Reconnaissance Office the most practicable means in the present circumstances for achieving the intent of the Board. The attached memorandum by the Chairman, COMOR, reports the results of this discussion for the information of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. It is not planned to schedule the attachment on the agenda of a USIB meeting unless so requested by a Board member by 22 May 1964.


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Executive Secretary ✓

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USIB-D-41.14/144
(COMOR-D-48/71)
14 May 1964
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Priority Scheduling of China for KH-4

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.15/34; COMOR-D-48/68

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Board.
2. COMOR has discussed with the NRO its proposed action to respond to the Board's decision on 29 April with regard to early emphasis in satellite collection on China.
3. The NRO's plan to respond to the Board's guidance is as follows:
 - a. An attempt will be made on 1006 (the next J) to maximize the coverage in China by maximum use of weather information. (Climatology indicates that the weather at this time of year in China can be expected to be unfavorable.) The remainder of the film will be used elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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USIB-D-41.14/144
(COMOR-D-48/71)
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b. If the weather in China on Mission


1006 proves to be favorable permitting relatively good coverage of China, Mission 1007 will be flown to maximize collection against the USSR while still obtaining some coverage of China.

c. If, however, the weather in China on 1006 is unfavorable, Mission 1007 will be designed to maximize coverage in China within the limits of good weather.

4. COMOR concurs that the foregoing is the best approach available to the NRO to meet the intent of the Board in the reference. In its consideration of this question, COMOR was advised that the angles of inclination already selected for either 1006 or 1007 will provide the best possible opportunity to maximize coverage of China. In addition both missions are programmed for 7 or 8 days in orbit with no intervening zombie mode.

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[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance



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
48/70

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Priority Scheduling of China for KH-4:
Proposal of the Navy Member

The attached memorandum received from the Navy member
of COMOR is distributed at his request that this be considered at the
14 May COMOR meeting.



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James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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9 QACSI TCO
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COMOR-D-~~56731~~

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Discussion of Satellite Reconnaissance
Scheduling and Priorities

REFERENCES: A. USIB-D-41. 15/54; COMOR-D-45/68
4 May 1964
B. COMOR-D-56/25, March 1964
C. COMOR Working Group-D-2/6, 6 May 1964

1. COMOR has received guidance via reference A, along with the NRO, for the establishing of priorities and the collection of photography concerning the China problem. Reference A is not completely understandable as to the relative target priorities between China and the USSR.

2. Reference B sets forth the target priorities to guide the COMOR Working Group and the NRO and is still current and in effect. The current priority list is as follows:

- a. Extraordinary - None.
- b. Highest Priority - As set forth in reference C.
- c. Priority -
 - (1) Remainder of KH-4 targets in the USSR, China, and the European Satellites and "holidays" (prior to January 1963) in the USSR.
 - (2) KH-4 targets in North Korea and "holidays" (prior to January 1963) in China, North Korea, and European Satellites) (excluding Yugoslavia).
 - (3) Polynesia KH-4 targets.

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- (4) Middle East KH-4 targets.
- (5) Sahara KH-4 targets.
- (6) Sino-Indian Border area.
- (7) Congo area.

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


Seven China targets are listed in the Highest Priority List for KH-4 collection in reference C.

3. The Navy position, based on the discussion and conclusions of reference A, is that China coverage will have the highest priority - over the USSR and all other targets - on the additional (second) KH-4 mission scheduled during May - June. Mission 1006 and 1007 are currently scheduled for May by the NRO. In view of references A, B, and C, it appears prudent to launch the first "J" package for normal collection (i.e., as stated in references B and C) and the second "J" package for special collection against China.

4. As stated in reference A, the two "J" missions per month will adequately attack the China problem. It is suggested that the second "J" package per month should be specifically programmed against China by special targeting and a restricted or reduced inclination angle. This method of using the second package for special purposes could carry over into other geographical areas as the need arises. Proper China targets are available to the CWG for programming a special "J" mission.

/S/



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39 DDP TCO
40 DDS&T TCO
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Contra Gen
SA (COMOR) / DDS&T
COMOR D-48/69

14 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: ARGON Photo Requirements

1. The attached paper was distributed at the meeting today by the DIA representative. The members took a copy home and agreed to advise the Office of the Chairman by cob today if they disagreed with the paper. If no messages are received, the Chairman will conclude that the paper is approved and will so advise the NRO.
2. Meanwhile, COMOR recommends that the map charting official in the DOD consult with the NRO to work out any detailed problems that appear.

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[Redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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COMOR-D-48/69
14 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: ARGON Photo Requirements
REFERENCE: COMOR-D-48/62, Dated 19 March 1964

1. As indicated in the reference, COMOR recommended that the launch time for the next ARGON mission be accomplished at 1530Z (0730 ± 30 minutes PST). Recently the DIA staff was informed that the launch window for ARGON Mission 9065 had been established by the operator of the program as 1500-1900Z. As indicated below the latter cited launch window is not acceptable.

2. The primary purpose of Mission 9065 is to obtain data for bridging between the major datums to strengthen the world-wide framework of geodetic control. The delay in launch time by four hours will eliminate some of the strongest bridges that are essential to the success of the exploitation of the data resulting from this mission. For example, the change in time will delay selected passes over Alaska [redacted] until darkness, which will change the bridge to a cantilever and destroy the primary purpose of its use. If the launch took place after 1630Z, these bridges would not be possible, and Mission 9065 could not possibly fulfill the requirement for which it has been justified.

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3. Accordingly, request that the launch window be held to 1500 to 1600 Zulu and, if not launched by 1630 Zulu, that the launch be delayed until the next day.

4. If the May ARGON mission is not successful, it will be important to follow with the back-up mission within 20-30 days in order to minimize on-location time for optical camera crews photographing the flashing light in foreign countries and to take advantage of maximum daylight in the northern hemisphere. In this connection it is requested that:

a. The orbital parameters for the potential second ARGON mission be the same as the May ARGON mission.

b. The launch date for the back-up mission be scheduled 30 days after the launch of the current May ARGON mission.

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/S/

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Colonel, USAF

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COMOR-D-48/69

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36 CGS ReqBr/ReconGrp
37 Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp
38 AD/SI
39 DDP TCO
40 DDS&T TCO
41 C/Action/DDS&T
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USIB-D-41.15/34
(COMOR-D-48/68)

4 May 1964

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Supplementary section attached

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Discussion of Satellite Reconnaissance Schedule

1. In restricted session at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 29 April, the Chairman asked the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DD/NRO), if he had any information regarding satellite scheduling which would be of interest to the Board. In response [REDACTED] furnished the following information:

[REDACTED]

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c. 1007, a CORONA-J, is presently scheduled for 20 May.

d. An ARGON is scheduled for sometime during the third week in May.

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CORONA/ARGON [REDACTED]

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USIB-D-41.15/34
(COMOR-D-48/68)
4 May 1964
Limited Distribution

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e. From May onward, the schedule allows one CORONA-J [redacted] per month. NRO is studying the possibility of accelerating CORONA-J to two per month.

2. Mr. McCone expressed his serious concern and that of the Board in the continued failure of these intelligence satellites. Pointing out the success record of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in orbiting space vehicles, the Chairman emphasized that NRO should not spare any effort to correct deficiencies and to better reliability in the satellite reconnaissance program. The DCI noted we were entering a period in which, due to improved weather and light conditions, our satellite collection program should be most productive. The Chairman also pointed out that we were also approaching a period in which our intelligence needs were greatest in meeting the requirement for contributions to the highly important NIE 11-8 and other estimates of Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities.

3. The DIA Member advised that the Deputy Secretary of Defense had levied a requirement for an additional satellite mission in each of the months of May and June for the primary purpose of covering targets in China. In expressing the concern of the DOD at the continued passage of time without adequate coverage of China, General Carroll pointed out that, due to various [redacted]

Soviet Union. The Chairman stated that he had discussed this problem with Secretary McNamara, and it appeared that by giving China a substantial priority in the May missions, we could get good coverage of that area and additional coverage of the USSR as well.

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CORONA/ARGON [redacted]

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CORONA/ARGON

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USIB-D-41.15/34
 (COMOR-D-48/68)
 4 May 1964
 Limited Distribution

4. Mr. McCone stated that no extra vehicle would be available in May, due to the failure of mission 1005, and recommended that China coverage be given high priority in the next scheduled missions. General Carroll stated that it was his understanding that there are now an adequate number of vehicles available to respond to the expressed Defense requirement for China coverage. The DD/NRO stated this was not a question of number of vehicles but that the 25X1A competition was in fact for film, 90 per cent of which was being spent on the Soviet Union in the CORONA program under present orders. [REDACTED] suggested that NRO be given authority to elevate China to a priority equal to that given to coverage of the USSR for two or three missions, which he believed would not unduly degrade overall Soviet coverage. The DD/NRO stated that an estimate of coverage of China on a given J mission is difficult because of poor weather at this season. General Carroll concurred in the full utilization of the film over the Soviet Union and elsewhere provided that China coverage was given primary priority. He reiterated that he was not recommending that China coverage be in competition with that of the Soviet Union and, since shortage of film in a particular vehicle had been responsible for lack of China coverage, he was recommending that, subject to operational and weather factors, additional satellites be used to satisfy the Defense China requirement without detracting from needed coverage of the Soviet Union.

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(COMOR-D-48/68)
4 May 1964
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6. After further discussion, USIB:

a. Expressed its serious concern that NRO spare no effort to correct deficiencies and to better reliability in the satellite reconnaissance program.

b. Agreed that NRO be instructed to give China coverage priority on two CORONA-J missions during the period, May-June, after which USIB would review the status of coverage of both China and the USSR.

c. Noted that NRO and COMOR will coordinate on re-targeting guidance [redacted]

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[redacted] Executive Secretary

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COMOR-D-48/67

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Target Information

Attached for your information is a memorandum directed to me by General Martin of NRO on the subject of arranging and transmitting targeting information [redacted]. Also attached for your information and to keep you up to date is a copy of my reply to the Director, [redacted] NRO Staff.

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NRO

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments (2)

Subject memo from D/NRO Staff
Ch, COMOR reply to NRO

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4 DIA [redacted]
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	36	CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
	37	Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp
	38	AD/SI
	39	DDP TCO
	40	DDS&T TCO
	41	AD/EL
	42	AD/SA
	43	FA/OSA
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	47	RB/OSA
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
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COMOR-D-48/66

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CORONA

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(COMOR-D-48/65)
6 April 1964
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Programming of Standby Satellite

REFERENCE : TOP SECRET [] , 1 April 1964

25X1

1. At the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 2 April in restricted session, the Chairman, in light of the divergent views in response to the reference, asked [] to brief the Board on this matter.

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
2. The Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DD/NRO), indicated that the single package vehicle 9064-M was presently counting for a 7 April launch pending a USIB decision to use this vehicle now. The DD/NRO noted that the next J was presently scheduled for 24 April and

[] the decision was made to fire the M at this time. [] stated, that due to damage sustained in an accident, the only other remaining M payload was presently being rebuilt and would not be available for launch until mid-summer, and that for the present, 9064 should be considered the last currently available M. In response to a question by the Chairman regarding our last missions, [] replied that both packages of 1004-J had been successfully recovered on the 18th and 22nd of February; [] but that a J scheduled [] and launched on 24 March had failed to orbit. The DD/NRO added that a J

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USIB-D-41, 15/33
(COMOR-D-48/65)
6 April 1964
Limited Distribution

would be available about 1 - 15 May in R - 7 category, but the fact that NRO had no experience in the use of the J model in a standby configuration as a backup, made the question of using the last M at this time somewhat critical.

3. The Chairman noted that the plan, previously endorsed as meeting USIB requirements, for a schedule of one J shot per month with an R - 7 M backup had not been met due to many varied factors. [REDACTED] of NRO, using a chart of the USSR and Communist China, then briefed the Board on the extent of success of recent missions in filling priority intelligence gaps, and on the current programming for 9064. Responding to a question by the DCI, [REDACTED] stated that the proposed programming for 9064 was essentially the same as the program for the highly successful 1004-J based upon current COMOR requirements. The slight changes in COMOR requirements since 1004 have been incorporated into the program for 9064.

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4. The DIA Member noted that his vote to launch 9064-M at this time was based (1) on existing requirements for current coverage, and (2) on advice received that there were two R - 7 M's available as standbys. General Carroll disagreed with the CIA-State view that because of the excellent coverage achieved by 1004-J there is not a valid need for another satellite mission at this time. He noted that with the exception of the February mission we had obtained no J or M coverage for four months. He stated however that the information now presented that there was only one standby vehicle available injected a new factor for consideration - but it did not affect the validity of the intelligence requirement. The Chairman, while agreeing that the points made by General Carroll were all true, nevertheless recommended that, because this was the last M available until mid-summer and in view of the J presently scheduled for 24 April [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] not be launched at this time and NRO be requested to hold to the date of 24 April on the J. The DIA Member stated it was his understanding that this recommendation was not predicated on a lack of valid

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CORONA

CORONA

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USIB-D-41.15/33
(COMOR-D-48/65)
6 April 1964
Limited Distribution

intelligence requirements but on the fact that this was our last M until mid-summer. The DCI replied in the affirmative and added that, in view of the failure of the 24 March J, he believed it more prudent to provide a backup to the next J. Mr. McCone also noted that we were now entering a period of better light conditions, and it was for these reasons he had made his recommendation rather than any question regarding the intelligence requirements. The NSA Member stated that his affirmative vote to launch 9064 was based solely on the intelligence requirement, but indicated that in view of the approaching season of better light conditions and our limited [REDACTED] vehicle resources, he would now vote to delay using [REDACTED]

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5. In response to a question by the Navy Observer, the DD/NRO indicated he believed that 9064 could, in about 24 hours after request, be returned to R - 7 status and hold that status for about three weeks. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated he wished to confirm the length of time that 9064 could be held in R - 7 status.

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6. The Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), stated that the split view expressed by COMOR in response to Question 1 in the reference was based solely on requirements. The DIA Member stated that although he was still concerned about the requirement for current coverage, he believed it would be more effectively satisfied by the Chairman's recommendation.

7. After further discussion and in view of 9064-M being the last M available until mid-summer, the USIB concurred in the Chairman's recommendation that 9064-M not be launched at this time.

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[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

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CORONA

COMOR-D-48/64

27 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: KH-4 Satellite Schedule for April

Attached for the information and reference of COMOR is a memorandum on the above subject for the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board for resolution by such means as he determines.

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
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject paper.

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CORONA

COMOR-D-48/64

MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT KH-4 Satellite Schedule for April

1. A review of recent satellite photo reconnaissance shows that both packages of a very good KH-4 (1004-J) were recovered on 18 and 21 February, respectively, and an excellent

25X1D

2. There is a requirement for satellite photographic search coverage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc at the rate of about once per month. KH-4 Mission 1003-J was scheduled and launched on 24 March to meet the requirement for March but failed to orbit.

3. The standby KH-4 vehicle, 9064-M (a single package) can be launched seven days after notice. We are advised that the next J may be available on or about 24 April.

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25X1D

4. COMOR has considered whether in the light of the requirement and these events and circumstances, a request should be made to proceed with launching 9064 and not to wait until 24 April for a J mission.

5. Recommendation*

a. That the NRO be requested to launch a KH-4 (9064) as soon as feasible. This CORONA launching would be against normal CORONA search requirements.

b. That the NRO be prepared to launch a KH-4 within 30 days after a above assuming it is successful. If a is not successful, NRO should launch another KH-4 as soon as possible.

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CORONA

COMOR-D-48/64

intelligence need to launch the 9064 standby early in April. They feel that it would be best to preserve 9064 as a standby and they recommend that instead a J mission should be launched as scheduled in April.

[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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COMOR - D - 48/64

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Mr. James Q. Rader

or



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This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

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Mr. Reber 5B2P3D

CORONA/LANYARD [redacted]

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USIB-D-41.13/7
18 March 1964
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JK

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: NRO Program and Plans for Improved Satellite
Reconnaissance System

1. As requested by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO) presented a briefing on the subject to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in restricted session at its meeting on 18 March 1964.

2. Dr. McMillan first reviewed the current capability as represented by the CORONA J configuration, and explained measures being taken to make improvements in that capability.

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
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[redacted] being given a preliminary design study based upon CORONA/LANYARD

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USIB-D-41.13/7
18 March 1964
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7. The D/NRO concluded his briefing with a description of measures in hand and being studied to reduce vulnerability of reconnaissance satellite systems to outside interference.

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[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

CORONA/LANYARD

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COMOR-D-48/63



27 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

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Attached for the information and reference of
COMOR is a copy of the memorandum forwarded to the Director,
National Reconnaissance Office, as approved by COMOR at its
26 March meeting (see COMOR-M-232, para 4).

25X1A

[REDACTED]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment
Subject paper

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4 DIA [REDACTED]
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9 OACSI TCO
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16, 17 NSA TCO
18, 19 NRO TCO

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
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36 CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
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ARGON

COMOR Gen.

COMOR-D-48/62
(Revised)

19 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: ARGON Photo Requirements

25X1A

At the COMOR meeting of 12 March (see COMOR-M-230, para 12), [redacted] called attention to the need for a change in the parameters stated in the previous paper on this subject (see COMOR-D-48/60). The Committee agreed to accept the suggested revision. The Chairman was requested to reissue the document as amended for the information and reference of the COMOR and for the specific use of the NRO in preparations for the ARGON mission currently scheduled for May 1964.

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[redacted]
James Q. Nease
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment
Subject paper

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4 DIA [redacted]
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10, 11 ONI TCO
12, 13, 14, 15 AFNIN TCO
16, 17 NSA TCO
18, 19 NRO TCO

NOTE: Recipients of this document are requested to destroy the previously issued COMOR-D-48/62 dated 16 March 1964 and to substitute this revised edition.

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
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ARGON

COMOR-D-48/62
(Revised)

3. It is understood that an additional experimental payload planned for inclusion with the primary ARGON payload may affect the present design parameters in that it will require positioning the vehicle in the nose forward position rather than the nose aft position. In view of the limited number of ARGON packages and the urgency appended to successful achievement of this type of coverage, the COMOR recommends against any vehicle alteration which would significantly reduce the probability of a successful ARGON mission.



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(Revised)

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36	CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
37	Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp
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COMOR-D-48/62

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: ARGON Photo Requirements

At the COMOR meeting of 12 March (see COMOR-M-230, para 12), [redacted] called attention to certain errors in the previous paper on this subject (see COMOR-D-48/60). The Committee agreed to accept the suggestions for ~~revision~~ correction. The Chairman was requested to reissue the document as amended for the information and reference of the COMOR and for the specific use of the NRO in preparations for the ARGON mission currently scheduled for May 1964.

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ANSWER

~~Chairman~~
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

**Attachment
Subject paper**

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	18, 19	NRO TCO

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
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ARGON

COMOR-D-48/62

In view of the limited number of ARGON packages and the urgency appended to successful achievement of this type of coverage, the COMOR recommends against any vehicle alteration which would significantly reduce the probability of a successful ARGON mission.

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COMOR-D-48/61 25X1A

2 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: [redacted] 25X1D

By publication of the attached memorandum it is transmitted to the NRO for action and to the COMOR members for information and reference.

[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachment

Subject memo

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
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ARGON

COMOR-D-48/60

2 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: ARGON Photo Requirements

At the COMOR meeting of 27 February (see COMOR- M-228, para 11), COMOR approved the attached memo which is by this publication transmitted to the NRO as guidance in connection with the ARGON program.

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


James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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COMOR-D-48/60

number of ARGON packages and the urgency appended to successful achievement of this type of coverage, the COMOR recommends against any vehicle alteration which would significantly reduce the probability of a successful ARGON mission.

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COMOR-D-48/60

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21 - 30	Asst/OPS(NPIC)
31	DDI TCO
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36	CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
37	Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp
38	AD/SI
39	DDP TCO
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41	AD/EL
42	AD/SA
43	FA/OSA
44	ID/OSA
45	SS/OSA
46	SAL/OSA
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USIB-D-41.15/31
(COMOR-D-48/59)
29 January 1964
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Discussion of Satellite Reconnaissance Schedule

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/30 (COMOR-D-48/58), 6 January 1964

1. As requested by the Acting Chairman at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 29 January, Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) advised the Board on recent developments and current status of the satellite reconnaissance schedule. He referred to the last schedule which he had presented (see reference) which had been as follows:

<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>J</u>
(M)	(M)	*(J)	*(J)	A	A
J	J	J	J	J	J

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[REDACTED]

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The D/NRO said that the only change since then had been that on 9 January the two stand-by J's marked by asterisks had been moved to May and June.

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USIB-D-41.15/31
(COMOR-D-48/59)
29 January 1964
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that the double weather satellite was successfully launched on 17 January. Noting that these missions were working well, he explained that the two weather satellites were programmed so that between them they provided two-satellite coverage over the USSR 60 to 70 per cent of the time.

3. The D/NRO reported that J-3, scheduled for 20 January, aborted because high winds caused premature release of the umbilical cables. Subsequent exposure to high winds and rain resulted in water, sand and salt getting into the payload so that it has to be reworked. A J, perhaps with different hardware, has been rescheduled for launch 13 February. At the suggestion of General Carter, Dr. McMillan agreed to determine whether the very high winds had been forecast.

4. The D/NRO stated that M-27, which had been scheduled for R - 7 on 23 January, is having to be reworked and will be rescheduled for R - 7 approximately the 1st of March. M-28 is scheduled for R - 7 condition on 7 February, and therefore could be launched after 13 February. Scheduled launch of G-5 has slipped from 28 January to 30 January.

5. Referring to previous discussion regarding the postponement of the J-3, Dr. McMillan said that the next J now scheduled was for launch 13 February, and that a possible backup could be available about 14 February. He said, however, that he would not recommend a countdown for the M for 14 February but would hold it until it was possible to get a good diagnosis of the 13 February J Mission. Responding to a question by the Acting Chairman as to whether this meant the M would not be launched until about 1 March, the D/NRO said that if the J Mission was diagnosed as a failure the M might be scheduled as early as 20-22 February.

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USIB-D-41.15/31
(COMOR-D-48/59)
29 January 1964
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7. As indicated above, the USIB noted and discussed the satellite reconnaissance schedule as presented by Dr. McMillan.




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USIB-D-41.15/30
(COMOR-D-48/58)
6 January 1964
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Discussion of Satellite Reconnaissance Schedule

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/29 (COMOR-D-48/57) 30 December 1963

1. At the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 3 January, Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), reported that the preliminary readout from M-26 indicated it had been a generally successful mission. The D/NRO then reviewed for USIB the schedule for the immediate future, as follows:

- a. A J available and scheduled to go on 7 January
- b. An M standing by for 10 January

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- d. A double weather satellite scheduled for 18 January


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Dr. McMillan pointed out that the J presently scheduled for launch on 7 January was of considerable R&D importance as its performance would determine whether we can depend upon the J system, although he felt fairly confident about it. He stated, however, that he knew of no particular R&D reason for adhering to the 7 January launch date. Mr. Reber noted that COMOR members almost uniformly agreed that coverage in January was required. The D/NRO and [REDACTED] discussed with the aid of a map the options which J-3 might give in

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
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USIB-D-41.15/30
(COMOR-D-48/58)
6 January 1964
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intelligence coverage. Dr. McMillan stated that NRO could hold J-3 for any reasonable time, but that the difference might be between holding a week or two weeks.

2. In response to a question by the Acting Chairman whether there was any need to use the M-27 presently counting for 10 January, the D/NRO stated that, in addition to the regular one J scheduled per month:

- a. An additional standby M was scheduled to be available in February
- b. An extra J was scheduled to be available in March, which could be considered a standby
- c. Another standby J would be available in April.

The D/NRO also noted that even if it was necessary to consume all our standby M's, we are not poor in equipment as we have other systems available for scheduling.

3. After a discussion of minimum acceptable periods between launches and a solution to a possible conflict [REDACTED] if J-3 is delayed, USIB agreed:

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- a. That the D/NRO should have flexibility in selecting a date between the 14th and 20th of January for launching J-3
- b. That M-27 should be held pending further USIB consideration.

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Executive Secretary

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USIB-D-41.15/29
(COMOR-D-48/57)
30 December 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Report by Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/28, (COMOR-D-48/56),
19 December 1963, Limited Distribution

1. At the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 27 December, the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), informed the Board that the capsule from M-26 had been recovered on the evening of 26 December, that the film was now being processed, and that by noon on 28 December we should know the degree of success achieved.

2. Mr. Kiefer stated that J-3 was now counting for 31 December, but might possibly be moved back to 10 January.* He noted that J-3 was backed up by M-27 which was counting for 10 January. If however, J-3 is successful, M-27 would revert to the R-7 standby category.

*Mr. Kiefer advised the Secretariat on 30 December that, after reviewing the results of M-26, the scheduled date for J-3 has been set at 8 January.

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
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USIB-D-41.15/29
(COMOR-D-48/57)
30 December 1963
Limited Distribution

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
3. The Acting Chairman proposed that if J-3 is not successful, USIB might want to reconsider the use of the M-27 standby at this time, due to the fact that there are only two of these standby vehicles.



5. USIB noted:

- a. The DD/NRO report on the recovery of the M-26 capsule.
- b. Current plans for the use of J-3.
- c. That NRO would consult with USIB prior to using the M-27 standby.

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Executive Secretary

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ARGON/CORONA

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USIB-D-41.15/26
(COMOR-D-48/55)
11 December 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Additional ARGON Missions

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/25 (COMOR-D-48/53), 5 December 1963,
Limited Distribution

1. At the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting on 11 December, with Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), present, the Board considered the reference report by COMOR, and particularly the problem of possible conflict with other programs, and the lead time required for successive launches, if required.

2. Dr. McMillan stated that there would be no problem in scheduling three additional ARGON missions without interference to other projects, but pointed out the desirability of an immediate review of the results of each mission, in order to decide whether successive launches are required. A representative of the Army Map Service indicated that a hasty evaluation of each mission could be given NRO within about 48 hours, with more complete confirmation in ten days time. General Fitch briefly explained the need to fill in the gaps in coverage from previous ARGON shots. The DIA member said that he was glad to hear Dr. McMillan say that three ARGONs could be scheduled without interference with other projects, but questioned whether that took into account the problem of possible slippage in CORONA missions. General Carroll pointed out possible geodetic

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
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USIB-D-41.15 /26
(COMOR-D-48/55)
11 December 1963
Limited Distribution

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contributions from the new framing camera for the KH-4 [REDACTED] systems, which might reduce the requirement for additional ARGON missions. The Chairman, COMOR, stated that COMOR had considered this possibility but had expressed concern that consideration of this potential capability not delay programming for additional ARGON shots. Based on Dr. McMillan's statements, Mr. McCone noted that scheduling three ARGONS now would still leave some flexibility to consider other options later.

3. In light of the discussion, USIB approved the COMOR recommendation in paragraph 3 of the reference that NRO take appropriate action to schedule three additional ARGON missions for 1964 beginning at the earliest date in the summer, the number of missions to be flown to be dependent upon COMOR's review of each mission to ascertain whether subsequent missions are necessary.




Executive Secretary

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USIB-D-41.15/24
(COMOR-D-48/54)
5 December 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Revision of Satellite Reconnaissance Program
REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/22 (COMOR-D-48/52),
15 November 1963, Limited Distribution

1. At the 4 December meeting of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), briefed the Board on a recent failure in recovering a satellite reconnaissance package, due to reasons unknown at this time.

2. In view of this failure, the D/NRO then presented, and the Board discussed, the details of a revised satellite schedule during December and January which he anticipated would take care of the community's intelligence requirements. This schedule included one M and one J each in December and January. At the suggestion of Mr. McCone, Dr. McMillan said that, if the December shots are a success, the M shot scheduled for January could be kept as a backup. In answer to General Carroll, the D/NRO

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3. At the request of the Chairman, Dr. McMillan informed USIB that, in view of the series of failures and partial failures, he was setting up a board to investigate the technical management procedures at Lockheed (focusing initially on the M program) as well as the way the government has dealt with Lockheed. The D/NRO explained that the board would be composed primarily of non-governmental members, and would be looking principally at the engineering and quality control aspects of the program.

(Reissued: 12 December 1963)

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USIB-D-41.15/24
(COMOR-D-48/54)
5 December 1963
Limited Distribution

4. The Chairman commented that while he agreed with the need for such a board, he hoped that full recognition would also be given to those successful satellite reconnaissance operations which had contributed such valuable and unique information to U.S. intelligence estimates, especially the recently completed NIE 11-8-63.

5. USIB noted the revised satellite reconnaissance program and the formation of the board to investigate technical problems incident to the satellite program.

Executive Secretary/*V*

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USIB-D-41.15/25
(COMOR-D-48/53)
5 December 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Additional ARGON Missions

The attached memorandum from the Chairman, COMOR, will be scheduled for USIE consideration of the recommendation contained in paragraph 3 thereof, at the USIB meeting on 11 December 1963.

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Executive Secretary

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Attachment

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USIB-D-41.15/25
COMOR-D-48/53
5 December 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Additional ARGON Missions

1. The last ARGON mission scheduled and available in 1963 has now been accomplished in the completion of 9059A. The COMOR has received a briefing on the results of that mission in the context of the Department of Defense program for establishing geodetic control. This briefing revealed that taking into account cloud cover, the actual ephemeris, and some operational defects, about 50 per cent of the film was useable. It also revealed that there are a number of areas in Russia (in the far north and gaps between passes) which have not been covered. Valuable coverage of Antarctica was obtained. It was noted in this briefing that a lower angle of inclination would permit passes to cross the USSR from east to west, thereby increasing the likelihood that some of the gaps would be filled, subject of course to weather.

2. In the light of this briefing and the remaining needs of the geodetic program and in the light of the experience acquired through the previous missions, COMOR has concluded that additional missions will be required in 1964 to complete the acquisition of photography for establishing the geodetic base for which the ARGON program was devised.

3. Recommendation: That the NRO take appropriate action at this time to schedule additional ARGON missions for 1964 (estimated three or four) beginning at the earliest date in the summer, the number of missions to be flown to be dependent upon COMOR's review of each mission to ascertain whether subsequent missions are necessary. (The NRO advises that at this time such scheduling would not affect the other satellite reconnaissance programs.)

James Q. Keeler
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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(COMOR-D-48/52)

15 November 1963

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Briefing on Satellite Reconnaissance Program

1. At the USIB meeting on 14 November 1963, Dr. McMillan, Director, NRO, (D/NRO), in response to a request by the Chairman, USIB, briefed the Board on the Satellite Reconnaissance Program. The D/NRO displayed and explained a chart covering future schedules as currently planned, and another showing past experience. In regard to the latter, he explained, to the degree known, causes for partial or complete failures.

2. The Chairman commented on the excellence of the D/NRO's presentation and the complexity of the program, noting that successes achieved since June were very encouraging. Mr. McCone stated, with the concurrence of the Board, that the future program as presented appeared to meet USIB requirements.

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Executive Secretary

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USIB-D-41.15/21
(COMOR-D-48/51)
15 October 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Withdrawal of Document from USIB Consideration

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/17 (COMOR-D-48/45), 20 September 1963

The COMOR study of the needs for KH-4 satellite coverage during the remainder of 1963, which was circulated with the reference, is withdrawn, hereby, from USIB consideration at the request of the COMOR. The Chairman, COMOR, has advised that the Committee requested such action because it felt that, as a result of slippages in the schedule of satellite launches, the coverage recommended in the reference would now be approximated.

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Executive Secretary

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USIB-D-41.15/20
(COMOR-D-48/50)
8 October 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Need for Additional ARGON in 1963
REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/19 (COMOR-D-48/48),
26 September 1963, Limited Distribution

1. Intelligence Board members are advised hereby, for information and record, that the USIB, on 4 October 1963 (through medium of vote sheet action completed on that date), approved the COMOR recommendation in paragraph 6 of the reference, viz., that Mission 9059A be fired as presently scheduled, on or about 25 October.

2. Attached, also for information, is a copy of the correspondence which transmitted the above USIB decision to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), for appropriate further action.

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Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Attachment
USIB-D-41.15/20
(COMOR-D-48/50)
8 October 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Office of the Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE (NRO)

SUBJECT : Need for Additional ARGON in 1963

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/19 (COMOR-D-48/48),
26 September 1963 (copy attached)

25X1A 1. Please be advised, in confirmation of our telephone report on this date to of your office, that the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) has approved the recommendation made in the reference by its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), viz., that Mission 9059A be fired as presently scheduled, on or about 25 October 1963.

2. Accordingly, the above action is referred hereby to NRO for appropriate action.

(Signed)

Executive Secretary

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7 October 1963

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USIB -D-41. 15/19
(COMOR -D-48/48)
26 September 1963

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HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE -

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has been briefed on the results of the last ARGON, 9058A, and as a result of this briefing, in paragraph 6 recommends another ARGON during 1963.

2. 9058A had no significant malfunction and both the stellar and the main camera worked exceptionally well. However, because 9058A was limited to a 4 day mission and because it encountered bad luck with weather, significant gaps requiring coverage still exist. These factors resulted in only 985 frames over land when there was less than 50% cloud cover.

3. The briefing clearly displayed the gaps remaining in ARGON coverage and described the need to fill these with a side lap of 30%.
N/A

4. Mission 9059A promises to be better than 9058A, since it is planned as a 5 day mission rather than a 4 day mission, thus providing a capability to employ the available film supply more selectively over land areas.

5. COMOR concludes that the task of establishing sufficient geodetic position to permit optimum accuracy against targets in the USSR has not yet

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(Attachment to USIB -D-41. 15/19)

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USIB -D-41.15/19
(COMOR -D-48/48)
26 September 1963

been achieved and needs to be completed. The Secretary of Defense in emphasizing the short-term military need for geodetic position accuracy has also emphasized the longer-term requirement in observing that all reduction in the error in our accuracy equates to a general reduction in stockpile.

6. COMOR recommends that 9059A be fired as presently scheduled, on or about 25 October.

(Signed)
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance

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CORONA

COMOR-D-48/49

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1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Requirements for Satellite Photography for
Search [REDACTED] Intelligence for FY 1

25X1D

1. In connection with budget decisions which the NRO must face for FY 1965, the Director of Central Intelligence has requested COMOR to prepare and submit to the Board for its consideration a statement of the community's requirements for that period. These requirements can be stated in various ways but it is believed that it would be most useful if the requirements were related to numbers of missions in the context of our experience with the M, J, [REDACTED] taking into account, of course, the fact that we are still gaining experience with the J [REDACTED] R&D problems still to be settled.

2. The Chairman has prepared the attached paper for consideration of the COMOR. In the preparation of the paper he found paragraph 3 of COMOR-D-48/45 appropriate and useful. It is included as paragraph 1 of the attached. The tabs referred to in the attached draft are those which have been mentioned and are included in COMOR-D-48/45 which went to the Board but was never considered by them.

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[REDACTED]
James Q. Reeder
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachment: Subject draft

Copies 2, 3 State TCO

4 DIA [REDACTED]

5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCO

9 OACSI TCO

10, 11 ONI TCO

12-15 AFNIN TCO

16, 17 NSA TCO

18, 19 NRO TCO

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COMOR-D-48/49

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 20 TSO CIA
 21-29 Asst/OPS(NPIC)
 30 LS/PID(NPIC)
 31 DDI TCO Special Center
 32, 33 CGS
 34, 35 CIA COMOR Member
 36 CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
 37 Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp
 38 AD/SI
 39 DDP TCO
 40 DDS&T TCO
 41 AD/OSA
 42 FA/OSA
 43 ID/OSA
 44 SS/OSA
 45 SAL/OSA
 46-50 SA/DDS&T

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25X1A KEYHOLE, [REDACTED]
CONTROL SYSTEMS
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41.15/19
USIB-D-41.14/19
(COMOR-D-48/48)
26 September 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963

1. The attached COMOR memorandum on the subject is forwarded for consideration and telephone action on the Committee's recommendation in paragraph 6.

USIB Action Requested

2. USIB members are requested to advise the Secretariat, telephonically, by noon on 1 October 1963, of either their concurrence in or objection to the COMOR recommendation in paragraph 6 of the attachment.

[REDACTED]

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Colonel, USAF
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment

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KEYHOLE, [] Controls ARGON

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USIB-D-41.15/19

COMO R-D-48/48

26 September 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has been briefed on the results of the last ARGON, 9058A, and, as a result of this briefing, in para 6 recommends another ARGON during 1963.

2. 9058A had no significant malfunction and both the stellar and the main camera worked exceptionally well. However, because 9058A was limited to a 4 day mission and because it encountered bad luck with weather, significant gaps requiring coverage still exist. These factors resulted in only 985 frames over land when there was less than 50% cloud cover.

3. The briefing clearly displayed the gaps remaining in ARGON coverage and described the need to fill these with a sidelap of 30%. It should be emphasized that this need and the recommendation to use another ARGON this year are pertinent only to achieving adequate geodetic position to hit targets within the USSR and is not part of any comprehensive program to cover the world land mass.

4. Mission 9059A promises to be better than 9058A, since it is planned as a 5 day mission rather than a 4 day mission, thus providing a capability to employ the available film supply more selectively over land areas.

5. COMOR concludes that the task of establishing sufficient geodetic position to permit optimum accuracy against targets in the USSR has not yet been achieved and needs to be completed. The Secretary of Defense in emphasizing the short-term military need for geodetic position accuracy has also emphasized the longer-term requirement in observing that all reduction in the error in our accuracy equates to a general reduction in stockpile.

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ARGON KEYHOLE, [] Controls

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25X1A KEYHOLE, [] Controls

ARGON

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6. COMOR recommends that 9059A be fired as presently
scheduled, on or about 25 October.

USIB-D-41.15/19

(COMOR-D-48/48)

[] James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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- 20, 21 NRO TCO
- 22, 23 TCO/O/DDI (copy 19 to be sent to DDI TCO)
- 24 DDP TCO
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- 30 ONE TCO
- 31-34 Chairman, COMOR(Copy 67 of Bi-weekly only)
- 35-38 OSA TCO
- 39 TSO CRA
- 40-50 TSO-DDI Special Center (Copy 18 to be sent to Special Center)
- 51 Director, NIC
- 52-66 USIB/S
- 67 Chairman, COMOR

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COMOR-D-48/47

D R A F T

24 September 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Need for Additional ARGON in 1963

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has been briefed on the results of the last ARGON, 9058A, and, as a result of this briefing, in para 6 recommends another ARGON during 1963.

2. 9058A had no significant malfunction and both the stellar and the main camera worked exceptionally well. However, because the system in 9058A lacked an adequate programming capability and because it encountered bad luck with weather, significant gaps requiring coverage still exist. The system in 9058A turned off during hours of darkness but could not be programmed to avoid concentrating the majority of the photography over water. This factor coupled with bad weather resulted in only 985 frames over land when there was less than 50% cloud cover.

3. The briefing clearly displayed the gaps remaining in ARGON coverage and described the need to fill these with a side lap of 30%. It should be emphasized that this need and the recommendation to use another ARGON this year are pertinent only to achieving adequate geodetic position to hit targets within the USSR

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ARGON

KEYHOLE, [] Controls

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downgrading and declassification

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Handle via TALENT ARGON

25X1A KEYHOLE, [] Controls COMOR-D-48/47

and is not part of any comprehensive program to cover the world land mass.

4. Unlike 9058A, the package designed for 9059A can include synchronous programming which will permit major concentration over the land masses. It is also planned to go for a 6-day mission rather than a 5-day one. This will provide a larger photographic scale and the combination of the added day and the ability to concentrate on land masses considerably enhances the possibility of filling the gaps.

5. COMOR concludes that the task of establishing sufficient geodetic position to permit optimum accuracy against targets in the USSR has not yet been achieved and needs to be completed. The Secretary of Defense in emphasizing the short-term military need for geodetic position accuracy has also emphasized the longer-term requirement in observing that all reduction in the error in our accuracy equates to a general reduction in stockpile.

6. COMOR recommends that 9059A be fired as presently scheduled, on or about 25 October.

James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Copies 2, 3 State TCO
4 DIA []
5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCO
9 OACSI TCO
10, 11 ONI TCO
12-15 AFNIN TCO 2
18, 19 NRO TCO

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ARGON

Handle via TALENT-

KEYHOLE, [] Controls

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KEYHOLE, [REDACTED] Controls

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COMOR-D-48/47

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30	LS/PID(NPIC)
31	TCO DDI SpeCenter
32, 33	CGS
34, 35	CIA Member COMOR
36	CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
37	Ch/COMOR WkgGrp
38	AD/SI
39	DDP TCO
40	DDS&T TCO
41	AD/OSA
42	FA/OSA
43	ID/OSA
44	SS/OSA
45	SAL/OSA
46-49	SA/DDS&T

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KEYHOLE, [REDACTED] Controls

ARGON

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KEYHOLE, [REDACTED] Controls

ARGON


USIB-D-41.15/18
(COMOR-D-48/46)
changed to COMOR-D-25/52
6 September 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Review of Requirement for Overhead Reconnaissance
of the Sino-Indian Border

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.14/16, 15 August 1963,
Limited Distribution



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CORONA/ARGON

comor D-48 file

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USIB-D-41.15/17
(COMOR-D-48/45)
20 September 1963


On 25 Sept 63 USIB agenda item removed at DCI request
see Army paper TCS-0392-63-KH, 13 Sept in USIB file
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

other pertinent papers including M Panel in DCI file.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963

The attached COMOR study of the needs for KH-4 satellite coverage during the remainder of 1963 has been placed on the agenda of the 25 September USIB meeting for Board consideration and action on the recommendation in paragraph 7.

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Colonel, USAF
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment

Copy No. 31

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CORONA/ARGON

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USIB-D-41.14/7

(COMOR-D-48/45)
20 September 1963

Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963

1. The COMOR has conducted a review of the amount of satellite photography recently acquired and attempted to project on the basis of past experience the likelihood of successes in the future and the quantitative as well as qualitative effects of such success on the intelligence community's exploitation and research processes. In this review, COMOR has excluded consideration of the KH-6 [redacted] because the missions to date have been essentially R&D in nature. In addition, ARGON has been excluded since its purposes are not principally the collection of intelligence information but rather information for specific geodetic and mapping programs.

25X1D

2. The COMOR has reviewed recent history on KH coverage. It notes first of all that, after review of a schedule submitted by NRO on 24 January, it requested revision of the NRO 1963 schedule to insure one J in May and June, 2 in July, 1 in August, 2 in September, and 1 in each of the 3 remaining months of the year. This scheduling became the official USIB recommendation in USIB-D-41.14/7 (COMOR-D-48/21) of 11 February 1963. Since February there has been slippage in the schedule. In July, Dr. McMillan submitted a revised schedule which was confirmed on 18 July by USIB-D-41.15/14 (COMOR-D-48/42) of 18 July 1963. This schedule called for the first J to be fired on 29 July, the second on 30 August, the third on 17 September, the fourth

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KEYHOLE Control System Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP75B00621R000100140001-1

USIB-D-41.15/17
(COMOR-D-48/45)

on 27 September, the fifth on 15 October, and the sixth on 24 October.

The seventh and eighth J packages were scheduled for November and December. There has been further slippage in the program since that time. There are still 6 Js scheduled for 1963.

3. The attached Tabs A, B, and C summarize the success we have had since June 1961 (a period of 2 1/4 years) in obtaining coverage of the critical targets on the following major target categories: ICBM complexes and missile R&D installations, missile production facilities, submarine bases, anti-ballistic missile sites, long-range airfields, nuclear energy facilities, and biological/chemical warfare facilities. These target categories will remain, for the most part, our major concern. If our launches are pointed toward coverage of these installations, we will almost certainly satisfy a very great number of our secondary target concerns and we are quite likely, through the manner in which the photographic capability is programmed, to achieve acquisition of the greater portion of the Soviet land mass.* Our long-range launch schedule should be based on the premise that we need quarterly coverage, at a minimum, of at least 50% of the targets in each category (which are the subject of the 3 tabs) and coverage of the whole of the Sov Bloc once a year.

4. We must take into account the scheduling and slippage

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*At Tab D is a tabulation of successful missions flown [redacted] showing the unique area coverage of the Soviet rail net as (expressed in percent of total) as obtained by each mission.

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USIB-D-41.15/17

(COMOR-D-48/45)

which is outlined in the first 2 paragraphs of this paper (which we must assume will in some degree continue as evidenced by the fact that within a period of one week the J 1002 slipped from 14 to 21 September and subsequently to 23 September) and that what is scheduled cannot be definitely anticipated to be successful.

5. The circumstances which we now face are as follows:

a. That our situation in regard to coverage has greatly changed since the spring and summer, a period during which difficulties in KH-4 satellite collection occurred. We have not only received good coverage in terms of quantity but we have had improvements in quality and we have been favored by repeated coverage of many of our highest priority targets. Thus our intelligence base has been very materially improved over what it was when the schedule for 1963 KH-4 missions was compiled.

b. The slippage in the schedules has now caused a bunching of missions in a season of the year less favorable to collection. There is a continuing need not only to be prudent with regard to avoiding unnecessary missions because of those costs involved

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TALENT KEYHOLE CORONA/ARGON TALENT KEYHOLE
Controls USIB-D-41. 15/17
(COMOR-D-48/45)

but also to be prudent with regard to the proper utilization of the United States Government's limited PI assets.

Conclusion:

6. That the intelligence requirements for KH-4 coverage can be met by a reduced number of missions for the remainder of 1963.

Recommendation

7. That NRO plan 4-day KH-4 missions at approximately 20-day intervals during the remainder of 1963.

[redacted]
James Q. Reser
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachments (4)
Tabs A, B, C, and D

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USIB-D-41.15/11
(COMOR-D-48/39)
2 July 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : ARGON Priority


REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41.15/8 (COMOR-D-48/36), 24 June 1963
b. USIB-D-41.15/9 (COMOR-D-48/37), 27 June 1963
c. USIB-D-41.15/10 (COMOR-D-48/38), 1 July 1963

1. In restricted session at its meeting on 2 July, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) discussed with the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) the question of ARGON priority in the light of his memorandum and its attached photographic satellite schedules circulated by reference c.

2. In beginning the discussion, Mr. McCone noted that under the current agreement governing the management of the National Reconnaissance Program, liaison with USIB is to be a responsibility of the Deputy Director, NRO. The Chairman said, however, that the Board would also welcome the attendance of Dr. McMillan whenever matters of concern to NRO were on the agenda. The Chairman directed the Executive Secretary to advise the Director, NRO whenever recommendations on matters affecting the NRO are scheduled on the agenda of a USIB meeting so that either the Director or Deputy Director of NRO may attend. Mr. McCone informed the USIB that Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer of the Central Intelligence Agency has now assumed duties as full-time Deputy Director of NRO.

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USIB -D-41. 15/11
(COMOR -D-48/39)
2 July 1963
Limited Distribution

3. After Dr. McMillan explained the technical and operational aspects involved in the satellite schedules attached to reference c., the Chairman and members of USIB discussed various alternative possibilities of meeting intelligence collection requirements in relative order of priorities. Following thorough discussion, the USIB agreed to recommend that the Director, NRO study the feasibility of responding to intelligence requirements by scheduling along the following lines:

a. One (1) CORONA "M" in each of the months of July, August and early September.

b. A backup for the above of one (1) CORONA "M" on 7-day standby.

c. One (1) ARGON in July or August.

d. J, L [REDACTED] Missions to be scheduled as early as possible consistent with a., b., and c. above.

In connection with the above, Dr. McMillan said that the ARGON Mission in October would also remain in the schedule.

4. The Director, NRO stated that he would undertake to work out a schedule along the lines recommended by USIB in the preceding paragraph. He said that he would communicate his findings to the Chairman, USIB, at which time consideration could be given as to whether a special Board meeting on Friday was necessary.




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cc: Director, NRO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

LJW Coran D-48/39

1 JUL 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT: ARGON Priority

References: a. Memorandum for Chairman, USIB from DNRO, same subject, dated 19 June 63

b. USIB-D-41.15/8 (COMOR-D-48/32), dated 24 June 63

c. Memorandum for DNRO from Chairman, USIB, same subject, dated 27 June 63

The technical problems that I referred to in the first paragraph of my memorandum to you of 19 June (reference a.) have caused further slippage in the July and succeeding months launch schedules. The impact of no CORONA type (M or J) mission before the last of July has compelled me to direct that the R-7, 13 July 63, standby CORONA be launched as a regular CORONA mission on 16 July 63.

In making this decision, I was aware of the Board's recommendation of 27 June (reference c.) that the 13 July R-7 vehicle be launched with an ARGON payload. I feel, however, that the information regarding the CORONA type launch capabilities on which the Board based its decision has altered sufficiently to make this action necessary. Alternatively, I have scheduled an ARGON mission for October with instructions to advance its launch date to earliest part of month feasible.

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DCES NOT APPLY

Brockway McMillan
Director
National Reconnaissance Office

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2 Atchs

1. July-Oct NRP Photo
Satellite Schedule
2. FY 64 NRP Photo
Satellite Schedule

CORONA
ARGON

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Trans. via [redacted]
Control System

as of
28 June 1963

JULY-OCTOBER 1963 NRP PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE SCHEDULE

	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
Mission	9057	1002	1004	1006
Type	CM	J2	J4	J6
Date	16	15	17	15
<i>9/21/63</i>				
Mission	1001	8004	1005	9058A
Type	J1	L4	J5	ARGON
Date	26	27	27	18
Mission	8003	1003	8005	1007
Type	L3	J3	L5	J7
Date	31	30	30	24

R-Q factors → *✓* + backlog
1 a - J a
add J-L-G as feasible

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Handle via []
Central System

as of
28 June 1963

FY 64 NRP PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE SCHEDULE

	SPARES		CY 63					CY 64						
	Pay-load	System	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
CORONA "M"			1				(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		
"J"		3*	1	2**	2**	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
"L"	***													
	3													
	5													
ARGON	1	4****						1						

25X1D

- NOTES:
- () Standby launches at continuous (sequential) R-7 condition.
 - * One each complete system available Oct, Nov and Dec 1963
 - ** One each of these J launches will be scheduled for primary launch as single recovery CM's secondary J. Decision to be made pending success of preceding J.
 - *** Three L payloads are currently available. Five additional LANYARD payloads available for launch Jan-June 1964.
 - **** Four additional ARGON payloads available for launch beginning June 1964.

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USIB-D-41.15/9
(COMOR-D-48/37)
27 June 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : ARGON Priority

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/8 (COMOR-D-48/36), 24 June 1963

1. In restricted session at its meeting on 26 June, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) considered the memorandum on the subject from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), in the light of comments thereon by COMOR, as circulated by the reference.

2. The USIB took the actions as recorded in the attached copy of a memorandum for the Director, National Reconnaissance Office from the Chairman, USIB.

3. This subject will be scheduled on the agenda of the next USIB meeting for further consideration as indicated in paragraph 3 of the attached memorandum.

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[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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Office of the Chairman

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Attachment
USIB-D-41.15/9
(COMOR-D-48/37)
27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT : ARGON Priority

REFERENCES : a. Memorandum for Chairman, USIB, from Director, NRO,
same subject, 19 June 1963
b. USIB-D-41.15/8 (COMOR-D-48/36), 24 June 1963

1. At its meeting on 26 June, the United States Intelligence Board considered the memorandum on the subject from the Director, NRO (reference a.) in the light of reference b.

2. The Board recommends that an ARGON mission be substituted for the standby capability (R-7) now scheduled to be available on or about 13 July. In making this recommendation, the Board understood that, if Mission 1001 fails, it would be feasible if required to convert Mission 1002 from J to an M package before 30 July.

3. The Board also took into account the possibility that the proposed ARGON mission may not be successful or may not provide all of the information necessary to complete geodetic control studies now in progress. The Board plans to consider at its next meeting whether to recommend at that time the scheduling of an ARGON mission in September, which could of course be cancelled if the first ARGON were completely successful. In the meantime, it is requested that NRO study this problem and the possibility of scheduling an ARGON mission in September, and advise the USIB of its findings.

(signed)

27 June 1963

JOHN A. McCONE

Chairman



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USIB-D-41.15/8
(COMOR-D-48/36)

24 June 1963

Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: ARGON Priority

1. Attached for the consideration of the Board at Tab A is a memorandum from the Director, NRO, discussing factors affecting the schedule of ARGON in the context of the satellite reconnaissance schedule.

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2. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has discussed this question looking toward the preparation of a recommendation for consideration of the Board. Aside from the substitution of an A mission for the [] which would take 4 months to accomplish and would be of marginal value because of the lateness of the season, there is no way, according to the advice from the NRO, to insinuate the A into the schedule over the next several months except through substituting it for an M, J, L, or standby (R-7) photo reconnaissance vehicle. []

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3. The COMOR could not come to a conclusion either at its meeting nor in subsequent discussions. This was due in part to a feeling on its part that there might be scheduling data relevant but not readily available to the intelligence community that would be important in a proper answer to this problem, and because of difference of views of what photo capability should be sacrificed.

a. The Army and Navy members of COMOR recommended that ARGON be scheduled as Priority 1 (but not at the cost of using the R-7 standby package) after Mission 9056 is launched, and that the ARGON be launched as soon as possible thereafter, and that steps be taken at this time to schedule the remaining ARGON package in the event an additional mission is required.

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USIB -D-41, 15/8
(COMOR -D-48/36)
24 June 1963
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b. COMOR members of other agencies felt that the matter would have to be discussed at the Board, taking into account the photo satellite schedule for July, August and September as provided informally to COMOR and the effect thereon of scheduling an ARGON during that period.

4. Accordingly, in view of the urgent need for USIB action on this matter, the attached memorandum is being scheduled for consideration on the USIB agenda at its meeting on Wednesday, 26 June. The Director, NRO, was invited to attend the meeting for this item but felt that it was unnecessary in view of the information already available to the community.

Executive Secretary

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Attachment

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ARGON/LANYARD/CORONA

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Tab A
USIB -D-41.15/8
(COMOR -D-48/36)
24 June 1963
Limited Distribution

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT : ARGON Priority

REFERENCES : a. Memo for Chairman, USIB from DNRO, same subject, dtd 3 May 63 [] 5 [] dtd
b. USIB -D-41.15/5 (COMOR -D- [] 15 May 63 (SC-05012-63) [] dtd
c. Memo for DNRO, same subject, dtd 22 May 63 (SC 2231-63)

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This is to advise the United States Intelligence Board that due to technical problems, a slow down in launching photographic (CORONA and LANYARD) payloads has occurred. In order to meet the intelligence community's priority needs, I have directed that utmost care be given these programs to maximize our success and that a standby CORONA M mission be retained on the schedule against a possible failure.

Since this standby mission uses the only pad that can be made available soon for ARGON, we cannot firmly schedule the next ARGON mission until the status of the standby mission is clarified. It is believed that the problem of a vehicle for the next ARGON mission can be solved without diverting a vehicle from a scheduled SIGINT mission, and without incurring the approximately four months delay required to convert such a vehicle to the ARGON configuration.

(Signed)
Brockway McMillan
Director
National Reconnaissance Office

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ARGON/LANYARD/CORONA

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COMOR-D-48/35

17 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Coverage Requirements for Frame
Camera of KH-6 System

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At the meeting of 7 June (see COMOR-M-177, para 8) [redacted] tabled a paper (SAO-01979-63TK, 6 June 1963) which he had prepared in response to the COMOR suggestion in COMOR-M-176, paragraph 4. [redacted] has now forwarded to COMOR for its information the attached document which went forward directly to the NRO as proposed. It is distributed herewith for information and reference of COMOR.

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[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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[redacted]

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CORONA/ARGON/LANYARD

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(COMOR-D-48/33)
23 May 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : ARGON Priority

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41.15/4, 6 May 1963
b. USIB-D-41.15/5, 15 May 1963

1. At its meeting on 22 May, the Board considered and discussed recommendations in response to the recent memorandum from the Director, NRO, on the subject (attachment to reference a.) which had been submitted by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in reference b.

2. USIB approved the COMOR recommendations, as submitted, i.e. :

a. That at this time LANYARD and CORONA (including R-7) have highest priority.

b. That ARGON have second priority and that it be accomplished in June if feasible.

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3. The above action was transmitted on 22 May to the Director, NRO, as USIB guidance on the subject matter.

[REDACTED] Executive Secretary

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USIB-D-41.15/5
(COMOR-D-48/32)
15 May 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : COMOR Recommendation Regarding ARGON
Priority

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.15/4, 6 May 1963, Limited Distribution

The attached COMOR memorandum on the subject, prepared pursuant to paragraph 2 of the reference, will be scheduled on the agenda of the 22 May USIB meeting for Board consideration thereof, including action on the recommendations in paragraph 4.



Executive Secretary



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USIB-D-41.15/5
(COMOR-D-48/32)
15 May 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: ARGON Priority

REFERENCE: [redacted]

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1. By the reference, the Executive Secretary, USIB referred to the COMOR a memorandum from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office pointing out that in order to launch an ARGON within the next three months a sacrifice of another program would have to be made. A vehicle presently scheduled to orbit a LANYARD, a CORONA, or [redacted] package would have to be converted to ARGON use.

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2. On the premise that the ARGON program should be completed this summer, a review has been made of the launchings scheduled for other programs in May and June. The dates given are subject to change so provide only rough guidance.

LANYARD May

CORONA-M May

CORONA-M May

 () May


CORONA-J June

LANYARD June

[redacted]
CORONA-Standby Available in June

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3. There has been only one successful CORONA mission this year. Normally, we would speculate that two CORONA-Ms in May



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USIB-D-41.15/5
(COMOR-D-48/32)

would begin to meet the recommended summer schedule of two a month and that a CORONA-J success in June would achieve virtually the same coverage. However, all three of these are using the Thrust Assisted Thor (TAT) so two failures would make it virtually essential to fire the CORONA standby. This is the R-7 referred to by Dr. McMillan; it carries an M package and relies on the Thor Agena. It appears, therefore, that until we may be sure of the reliability of the TAT a decision to sacrifice the R-7 is imprudent. The LANYARD relies also on the TAT so we may learn something of TAT reliability through the projected May firing of LANYARD.

4. Recommendations:

- a. That at this time L and C (including R-7) have highest priority;
- b. That ARGON have second priority and that it be accomplished in June if feasible; and

c. [redacted]

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[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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60-69	SA/DDR

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COMOR-D-48/31

11 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Requirement for Refinement of Timing for
Satellite Reconnaissance of Tyura Tam

For the information and reference of the members, there is attached a memorandum from the Chairman, COMOR to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office on the above subject and in pursuance of the action of COMOR at its meeting on 7 May, COMOR-M-171, paragraph 6.

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[REDACTED]
James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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COMOR-D-48/31

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office
SUBJECT: Requirement for Refinement of Timing
for Satellite Reconnaissance of Tyura Tam

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has considered a proposal that satellite reconnaissance missions be so scheduled as to permit the acquisition of photography over Tyura Tam during the preparations for a major activity such as a lunar probe or launch of a man into space. To be most effective the photo reconnaissance satellite should either pass over Tyura Tam two hours before launch or while the vehicle is en route to the pad. The following most probable dates and times for the launching of Soviet lunar probes of 1963 are based on the following considerations:

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CORONA/[redacted]/LANYARD/[redacted] Systems


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TALENT-KEYHOLE
[] Systems

COMOR-D-48 / 31

25X1B



2. COMOR requests that NRO take cognizance of the LUNIX launching schedules noted in paragraph 1b above in selecting a launch

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* If time of day is desired for days off optimum, see STL project
[] study No. 119.

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TALENT-KEYHOLE
[redacted] systems

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COMOR-D-48/31

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time for LANYARD [redacted] without detriment, however, to the targets already submitted on the chance that, with slight change, accommodation would be possible. It is possible that the second package in the CORONA-J might be activated on short notice and, while not improving the resolution of CORONA-M, might be in time to catch a major activity at Tyura Tam and thereby procure some dividend information.

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3. With regard to the possibility of observing preparation for a manned space vehicle activity, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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[redacted] LANYARD
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COMOR-D-48/31

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CORONA/ARGON/LANYARD

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USIB-D-41.15/4
(COMOR-D-48/30)
6 May 1963
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Relative Priority for Additional ARGON Flight

1. Attached as Tab A is a memorandum from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), requesting USIB guidance as to the near-term relative priority of the ARGON, LANYARD, CORONA and SIGINT satellite projects in order that NRO may schedule an additional ARGON flight in view of the 26 April ARGON launch failure.

2. The NRO memorandum is circulated at this time for the information of USIB members, and is referred herewith to COMOR for study and recommendation, including a draft reply to the Chairman, NRO, for consideration by USIB at its meeting scheduled for 15 May.

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Executive Secretary

Attachment

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CORONA/ARGON/LANYARD

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(Comor-D - 48/30)

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Director, NIC (c/o DIA TCO)

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59-61

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COMOR-D-48/29

25X1A

2 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Requirement for Refinement of Timing of Collection Against Tyura Tam

REFERENCE: Requirement for Implementing a Critical Technical Intelligence Collection Operation
COMOR-D-48/28

25X1A

The attached paper prepared by the CIA Member of COMOR
will be considered at the meeting of ⁷ May 1963 along with

memorandum. (See reference)

25X1A

James W. Nease
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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5 DIA(D/NIC)
6, 7, 8, 9 DIA TCO
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COMOR-D-48/29
30 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Requirement for Refinement of Timing of Collection
Against Tyura Tam

REFERENCE: Requirement for Implementing a Critical Technical
Intelligence Collection Operation (COMOR-D-48/28)

1. On the morning of 30 April COMOR-D-48/28 was discussed
25X1A between Lt. Colonel Goodfellow and Major Paynter of AFNIN. [redacted] 25X1A

25X1A [redacted] of NRO, [redacted] of NPIC, [redacted] of BMSD/OSI 25X1A

and the undersigned. It was generally agreed that to attempt scheduling
of CORONA-M against Tyura Tam would be unproductive not only because
such an attempt would be disruptive to other priorities but also because the
[redacted]

[redacted] These are the major
considerations although timing and the need to hold CORONA-M on a
standby basis would also weigh heavily against its use.

2. It was also recognized that while CORONA-J would not do
any better resolution-wise the ability to activate the second package on
short notice would eliminate the other inefficiencies connected with
CORONA-M and offer the attractive possibility of catching a major activity
at Tyura Tam at a crucial point when, [redacted] some
dividend information might be expected.

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COMOR-D-48/29

5. In any memorandum going forward to NRO it should be noted that better results might be obtained while either a LUNIK or manned vehicle is on its way to the pad rather than after it is in firing position.



25X1A

COMOR

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COMOR-D-48/29

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	24	LS/PID(NPIC)
	25	TSO CIA
	26,27	DDI TCO
	28,29	OSI TCO for CIA COMOR Member
	30,31	OSI TCO
	32	OCI TCO
	33	ORR TCO
	34	DDP TCO
	35	DDR TCO
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	37	FA/OSA
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	40	SAL/OSA
	41 ~ 43	SA/DDR

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COMOR-D-48/28

16 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Requirement for Implementing a Critical
Technical Intelligence Collection Operation

The attached paper was distributed by the Air Force representative (see TH1435-63KH). This paper will be on the 18 April COMOR agenda.

25X1D



James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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4 DIA [redacted]
5 DIA(D/NIC)
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11, 12 ONI TCO
13, 14 AFNIN TCO
15, 16 NSA TCO
17, 18 NRO TCO

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
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COMOR-D-48/28

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USIB-D-41.14/18
(COMOR-D-48/27)

8 March 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Targeting Requirements [redacted]

25X1A

1. The attached memorandum on the subject from the Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance with the attached memoranda from the Director, NRO Staff is circulated herewith for the information of USIB members. As indicated, this matter is also being referred to COMOR members for appropriate action.

2. As proposed in the attachment, it is not planned to schedule this matter for USIB consideration, unless so requested by a Board member or a particular problem emerges during COMOR action which requires USIB attention.




Executive Secretary

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Attachment
Chairman, COMOR Memo

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10, 11 ONI TCO
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USIB-D-41.14/18
(COMOR-D-48/27)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Targeting Requirements [redacted]

25X1A

1. For the information of the members of the Board there is attached a memorandum to the Chairman of the USIB from the Director, NRO Staff on targeting requirements for [redacted] Attachment 1). This paper is also being made available to the members of the Board's Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance for action.

2. Unless some particular problem emerges requiring the Board's attention, or a Board member desires USIB consideration of the subject, it is anticipated that the targeting requirements [redacted] will be handled by the COMOR directly with the NRO in the same manner as targeting requirements for CORONA and LANYARD.


3. This procedure is consistent with the memorandum from the Director, NRO Staff to the Chairman, COMOR (Attachment 2) which states that NRO will respond to direct guidance from COMOR, without specific USIB approval, in regard to the data essential to the actual operation of established projects, which do not affect costs or schedules, such as target lists and relative priorities of targets for specific projects or launches.

[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachments (2)

1. [redacted] 4785-63
2. [redacted] 4789-63



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USIB-D-41.14/18
(COMOR-D-48/27)

Office of the Under Secretary

Attachment 2
[redacted] 4789-63)
27 February 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, COMOR

SUBJECT: Relationship between the NRO and the COMOR

REFERENCE: Agreement between the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence
2 May 1962, [redacted] 1166-62)

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Further to our recent conversation concerning COMOR relationship with the NRO, I think it is desirable to summarize our present understanding.

The referenced Agreement is quite explicit: "The NRO will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal (SIGINT) collection requirements and priorities established by the USIB and will develop the over-all reconnaissance program to satisfy these requirements." The NRO understands the role of the COMOR in preparing such statements for USIB approval, and can work directly with COMOR as a subsidiary of USIB on some matters. However, any COMOR guidance having substantive impact on the National Reconnaissance Program or projects of this program must be approved specifically by the USIB. This includes any guidance for which compliance will result in changes in the configuration of the over-all program or any projects of this program, changes in cost, and changes in schedules. It also includes any documents which are intended to provide guidance as to the type and size of the program that should be developed by the NRO, such as USIB-D-33.6/8, "Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance Systems of which SAMOS is an Example," dated 5 July 1960, and any subsequent guidance intended as modifications or revisions of this basic document.

In regard to the data essential to the actual operation of established projects, which do not affect costs or schedules, such as target lists and relative priorities of targets for specific projects or launches, the NRO will respond directly to guidance from the COMOR without the necessity of specific USIB approval.

(Signed)

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COMOR-D-48/26

20 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Satellite Programming Procedures

Attached for the information and reference of the COMOR is a memorandum from the Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center to the Defense Intelligence Agency responding to a letter on the same subject. The information contained herein is relevant to COMOR's understanding of limitations on targeting. It is called particularly to the attention of the COMOR Working Group.

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Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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COMOR-D-48/26

SUBJECT: Satellite Programming Procedures

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REFERENCE: [redacted] -6623-63 Letter Same Subject from Chief,
Special Activities Office, DIA

1. Each time a picture is taken the problem of exposure must be considered. This is more complex for satellite photography than for manned aerial reconnaissance. Many factors are involved, e.g. camera, film, environment, collection vehicle, launch time, and last but not least the desired information to be obtained. Some of these are controllable, others noncontrollable and a few unpredictable. However, when all of these factors are weighed, there is often little latitude for choice in selecting the exposure settings for a given mission.

2. Sun angle is noncontrollable and dependent upon many other factors, such as time of day and year, orbital characteristics, and location of the target. Sun angle varies throughout a pass, between passes and on different days, thus the objective of the whole mission must be considered in weighing the effect of sun angle and its influence in determining the particular camera settings for a mission. On occasion, under favorable conditions, informative photography has been obtained with a sun angle below 7 degrees, but on other occasions insufficient illumination has been encountered with a sun angle greater than 7 degrees.

3. Approximately 55 percent of every mission is affected by clouds. At low sun angles cloud shadows may extend up to 50 miles or more, therefore, there must be sufficient exposure to obtain detail in these shadow areas. Experience has proven that considerable information may be gleaned from that portion of photography in cloud shadow.

4. In evaluating the results and accomplishments of successful missions of CORONA-MURAL program with [redacted] emulsion the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) has answered queries of those responsible for the planning and


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COMOR-D-48/26

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5. As other collection programs become operable their characteristics may be such that a different minimum sun angle could be supported as the basis for proper exposure. This minimum may be lesser or greater than the 7 degrees selected for the CORONA-MURAL system. Only by experience will NPIC be able to determine the minimum sun angle required for each system.



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COMOR-D-48/25

20 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: LANYARD Target List

1. Attached for the information and reference of
COMOR is a memorandum from the Assistant Director, Office
of Special Activities/DDR, CIA advising of the predicted effects
of the first LANYARD target list and advice for future target
lists.

2. It is requested that the COMOR Working Group
give this special attention.

25X1A



James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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
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15, 16--NRO TCO

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COMOR-D-48/25

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SUBJECT: LANYARD Target List

REFERENCE: [redacted] Attachment to COMOR-D-44/22
dated 5 February 1963)

1. The COMOR priority list for project LANYARD targets was used for mission 8001. I believe this list is a step in the right direction. However, it does have some limitations that can best be evaluated by giving you a short resumé of the camera program.

2. As you know, this mission, being the first in the LANYARD series, is primarily an engineering venture and we hope it will answer many questions that are presently in the minds of those associated with satellite development. For this reason, the first day's program is limited to vertical photography because, through mutual agreement, the roll joint will remain locked until after pass 16. This decision severely limited the first day's capability for coverage of targets as specified on the LANYARD target list.

3. In addition to the above, this mission is limited to the use of descending passes because of the illumination available this time of year.

4. The total number of LANYARD targets provided by COMOR was 225. Due to the limitations outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, as well as the system's limitations, it was only possible to program 106 of the targets for mission 8001 or less than 50 percent.

5. To remove the possibility of recovering the capsule without expending all of the film, passes were evaluated over the latest CORONA targets and additional operations were planned.

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CORONA/ LANYARD

COMOR-D-48/25

6. For future operations, you should bear in mind that ascending passes will increase the capability approximately 40 percent when maximum illumination permits. However, there are always those targets which cannot be covered due to system's limitations. In addition, some of the operations will be denied because of unfavorable forecast weather. To overcome these difficulties an expansion of the target list geographically would be in the best interest.

7. I bring this matter to your attention to show that the targeting list could be expanded if you and your committee feel national requirements justify it.

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USIB-D-41.14/9
(COMOR-D-48/24)
12 February 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Resumption of the ARGON Program

REFERENCES : (a) USIB-D-41.15/2, 28 January 1963
(b) USIB-D-41.14/4, 25 January 1963
(c) USIB-D-41.14/8, 7 February 1963
(d) USIB-D-41.14/7, Final-USIB Approved,
11 February 1963

1. The attached memorandum from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responds, as indicated therein, to Mr. McCone's memorandum of 26 January on the subject (attachment to reference (a)) and provides NRO comments and views on the action (noted in Mr. McCone's memorandum) which had been initiated by USIB to develop an up-to-date statement of intelligence requirements for satellite reconnaissance. (Note: References (b) and (c) contain the formal record of recent USIB actions regarding preparation of such a statement of requirements.)

2. This NRO memorandum is being circulated to USIB members at this time for information.

3. It is also being referred to COMOR: (a) for review and, if that Committee deems necessary, submission of any comments or recommendations regarding NRO actions pertinent to resumption of the ARGON program and (b) for use in preparing for USIB consideration the aforesaid overall statement of intelligence requirements for satellite reconnaissance.

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CORONA/ARGON

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(COMOR - D-48/24)
12 February 1963
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4. Pending a response to the above by COMOR, we do not plan to place this NRO memorandum on the agenda of a Board meeting unless so requested by a USIB member.



Executive Secretary

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(COMOR -D-48/24)
12 February 1963
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8 February 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Resumption of the ARGON Program

In response to your 26 January memorandum on this subject, ARGON flights have been scheduled in April and June 1963 without change in the schedule of CORONA flights. Although the necessary scheduling actions have been taken, we have not yet fully determined the adjustments to the previous schedule which will be required to support this action.

Within the limits imposed by long lead times characteristic of most satellite projects, the NRO has taken steps to provide the maximum possible scheduling flexibility within the NRP to permit decisions of this type. The payloads within the Thor launch schedule are, to a considerable degree, interchangeable with available non-scheduled payloads provided that decision is made within the lead times involved. Thus, the launch schedule actually represents commitments by payload type only within these lead times; beyond these times, available, non-scheduled payloads may be substituted for those shown in the launch schedule. However, the launch schedule does represent all launches available within existing NRO funding, and, normally, when payloads other than those shown on the launch schedule are inserted into the schedule, previously scheduled launches are deleted on a one-for-one basis. In this case, however, I am assuming that the USIB desires the ARGON flights be added without deletion of other flights, and am taking all possible steps toward this objective, including the requesting of the necessary additional funds.

In the event that adjustments to the NRP should be required, I would assume that they would have to be made in the SIGINT area, in view of the USIB recommendation of non-interference with the scheduled CORONA flights, and in view of previous direction to the NRO from the highest level concerning



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USIB-D-41.14/8
(COMOR-D-48/23)
7 February 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirements for Satellite
Reconnaissance

REFERENCES : (a) USIB-D-41.14/4, 28 January 1963 (COMOR-D-33.6/8) ✓
✓(b) USIB-D-41.5/12, 13 August 1962 ✓
✓(c) USIB-D-41.5/19, 14 September 1962 ✓
✓(d) USIB-D-33.6/8, 5 July 1960 ✓

D-48/20
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5/4
3

1. During the course of Intelligence Board consideration of USIB-D-41.14/7, at its 6 February 1963 meeting, reference was made to the request recorded in reference (a) which had been made to COMOR, and with respect thereto, USIB took the following action:

Concurred in a proposal that COMOR be directed to (a) review on a priority basis the USIB-approved statement of intelligence requirements for satellite reconnaissance systems contained in USIB-D-33.6/8, 5 July 1960, and (b), taking into account subsequent statements of such requirements by USIB and COMOR, prepare for Board consideration at an early date a comprehensive current statement of intelligence requirements for such reconnaissance which will amplify and bring up-to-date the overall USIB guidance to NRO on the subject.

2. USIB Action Memorandum 63/7 transmitted the above Board action to the Chairman, COMOR, with a request that this task be completed for consideration by USIB *as soon as possible*

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Executive Secretary

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Coron - D-48/22

5 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Requirements for the First LANYARD Mission

1. The attached paper was approved by the COMOR at its meeting on 31 January. COMOR's findings as expressed in this paper, along with the targets, was made available immediately to Operations in OSA/DDR/CIA which has the responsibility for programming.

2. The attachment to the letter to the D/NRO lists the targets. Because of a shortage of copies and because that list is not needed by some of the COMOR regular addressees, not all will receive that attachment.

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[REDACTED] James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment (TCS-0054-63-KH, 5 Feb 63)

Copy 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA ([REDACTED])

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9--OACSI TCO

10--ONI TCO

11, 12--AFCIN TCO

13, 14--NSA TCO

15, 16--NRO TCO

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Comor - D-48/22

5 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office
SUBJECT: Requirements for the First LANYARD Mission

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) in pursuance of a briefing on 17 January 1963 and a request from NRO to provide requirements by 1 February has approved the attached priority listing of targets for LANYARD.

2. The office of the NRO is requested to so program the February mission that vertical photography is acquired for the maximum number of priority one targets. It is COMOR's recommendation that in programming and in execution no target in any subordinate priority should be permitted to interfere with the coverage of any target in a higher priority. In anticipating the problems of the operator as they might relate to requirements, COMOR notes that occasionally there is a cluster of targets containing different priorities. To avoid confusion, we wish to make clear that target selection in such a case should follow the recommendation on priority precedence just stated.

3. In our effort to improve our requirements for subsequent missions and in order to get maximum intelligence information collectable by LANYARD, it is very important that COMOR be promptly advised of any feedback which the operator acquires in the first and subsequent operations which will be relevant to target selection. Particularly important in this is advance warning of the due date for the submission of requirements to permit programming in accordance with scheduling as it may change from time to time.

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
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COMOR-D-48/22

5. The time between the first and second L missions will not permit readout and revision of the targets to take account of the results of the first mission. Accordingly, the attached targets will apply for the second as well as the first mission. We understand that the first mission has an inclination of 75°. We recommend that the angle of inclination for the second should be 82 1/2°. If this angle is approved, some additional targets will be submitted.

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James M. Robey

Chairman
Committee On Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment: COMOR Priority Targets for Project LANYARD



Copy to Deputy Director (Research), CIA

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(COMOR-D-48/21)
Final-USIB Approved
11 February 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Satellite Reconnaissance Scheduling

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.14/7, 4 February 1963

1. USIB, at its 6 February meeting, considered the subject matter and, with respect thereto, took the following actions:

a. Noted the report on the subject (referenced above) which had been prepared by its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR).

b. Approved the COMOR recommendations regarding satellite scheduling in paragraph 8 of the reference, subject to: (1) amendment of the first sentence in sub-paragraph 8.a. and (2) modification of the text of sub-paragraph 8.b. to reflect USIB agreement that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) be requested to investigate and inform USIB regarding the possibility of providing a standby reconnaissance capability for use on call in crisis situations.

c. Agreed, with further reference to the subject schedule, that NRO should be requested to arrange a sufficient back-up of proven boosters to lift the existing type of CORONA payloads which may be required to provide essential coverage, in the event of failure or delay in operation of the new systems.

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2. The above USIB actions, together with a copy of the referenced paper, revised to incorporate the afore-indicated Board approved changes, were transmitted to the Director, NRO, by memorandum of this date. The Director, NRO, was requested in that communication to advise the USIB regarding NRO actions on the foregoing matters.


3. Attached for record purposes is a copy of the COMOR paper in its revised and approved form, less Tab A, which was not revised and which remains, as previously circulated, a limited distribution item.



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Executive Secretary

Attachment



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(COMOR-D-48/21)
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MEMORANDUM FOR : United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : COMOR Recommendation on Satellite Scheduling

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in pursuance of the request of the United States Intelligence Board (see USIB-D-41.14/4, COMOR-D-48/20) has, with the cooperation of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) reviewed the schedule for satellite photographic and electronic systems for the period through June 1964. Submitted as Tab A is a revision of the NRO schedule for satellite photographic and electronic systems. The COMOR recommendations on this are in paragraph 8 below.

2. Other actions pertinent to requirements guidance for the NRO are summarized as follows:

a. To assist in further research and development planning, a statement of the essential elements of information and the requirement for the resolution desired for satellite photography submitted to the NRO on 28 August 1962 (COMOR-D-61/1). This still constitutes valid guidance for research and development.

b. With regard to the electronics systems section of the schedule, COMOR believes that at this time it will meet requirements. However, a new statement of requirements is in the process of preparation and will be forwarded as soon as completed.

c. COMOR has completed and forwarded to the D/NRO the targeting guidance for programming the L mission scheduled for February. COMOR will continue to provide specific guidance for each of these missions.

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d. The USIB has notified NRO of the requirement for an ARGON mission in April to be followed by one in June if required.

3. In studying this program in cooperation with the NRO, COMOR was advised that the present schedule for photographic systems is not in competition with the electronic systems schedule or vice versa.

4. COMOR believes that, in evaluating the adequacy of the photographic systems schedule, the schedule for L [REDACTED] is adequate. These programs, it should be understood, are not a substitute for, but are complementary to, the M or J programs. Our needs for search and surveillance will be but little affected even if the L [REDACTED] programs, or both, are successful in coverage of high priority targets. COMOR feels that inasmuch as the L program is an interim and limited program, comment on it would not be constructive. With regard to the

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5. Our present major concern in the photographic field, therefore, is to evaluate the adequacy of the search and surveillance program for which the M and J systems were designed. Experience since the inception of the satellite program has furnished a basis for determining the frequency of coverage in general needed to satisfy most of our highest priority intelligence requirements using the present system in operation. In establishing the intervals at which this coverage should be obtained, the following factors were considered:

a. The average time lapses permissible in coverage of the various types of targets.

b. The average optimum time lapses for purposes of comparative coverage.

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c. The time required to process and interpret the results of a mission to a degree which will permit review of the highest priority objectives and revision or refinement of the target file and photo interpretation requirements.

6. The revised NRO schedule for the J-type satellite reflecting use of 4 of the spare systems as shown in the revision of Tab A is an adequate approach for satisfying the intelligence community requirement for a search and surveillance program conducted through satellite photography. (COMOR notes that failure of the J system would require the substitution of 2 M systems for every J in the schedule as revised if the requirement is to be met.) The revision takes into account the need for increasing surveillance during the good weather periods of 1963 and the first half of 1964, times which are optimum for maximum photographic collection. In summary, it should provide:

a. Potential coverage of priority targets at 10-day intervals during summer months when daylight and weather conditions are favorable.

b. Potential coverage of priority targets at 15-day intervals during the winter months, when adverse weather conditions and inadequate daylight render missions less productive.

7. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has been concerned that there should be available on a continuing standby a satellite reconnaissance capability for emergency, such as was faced by the United States Intelligence Board in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban crisis of 1962. It is COMOR's feeling that even under the best of circumstances, satellite reconnaissance both today and in the foreseeable future cannot produce information on a sufficiently timely basis to serve as an "indication source" as the term is normally used. However, in a continuing cold-war crisis period, even with the time lapse between launch and readout satellite reconnaissance can provide valuable intelligence

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information that could be critical in policy decisions. It is for this reason that COMOR submits for USIB consideration and approval the recommendation below in paragraph 8. b.

8. Recommendations:

That NRO be advised that:

a. USIB considers that the NRO schedule in Tab A (including the revision proposed by COMOR) will, if successfully carried out, meet essential intelligence requirements for satellite reconnaissance coverage as currently anticipated. The additional missions proposed will provide needed intelligence coverage during the good-weather months (July and September) in 1963 and the good-weather months up to mid-64 (April and June);

b. USIB requests that NRO investigate and inform USIB whether it would be possible to provide for use on call in future crisis situations a standby satellite reconnaissance capability, which would incorporate a vehicle programmed against the type of targets designated as possible indicators during the tension last October . Such a capability would include provision for immediate ent of vehicles fired and a means for these vehicles taking priority over other firings in the U. S. satellite schedule. The targets would be relatively few in number and the plan would be to program in such a manner as to cover a broad and representative selection of targets, and as many as possible, during each day's orbits.

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Attachment: "Schedule"--distributed
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(COMOR-D-48/21)

Tab A

COMOR Proposed Revision of the NRO Schedule
The revision is indicated by adding "one more J package"
in July & September 1963 and April & June 1964 (in red)

LAUNCH SCHEDULE

as of 22 Jun 1963

25X1 NRO	PHOTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS	PAYLOAD SYSTEM	1963												1964													
			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J				
	CORONA	120: Resolution general search	1			1	1	1																				
	JUN	130: Resolution general search			2	***			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	WLN	50: Resolution specific coverage	3			2	1	1	1	1	1																	
	ARGON	350: Resolution geodetic coverage	8			1	1	1	1	1	1																	

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25X1D	ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS	PAYLOAD SYSTEM	1963												1964														
			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J			SPARES SPARES			J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J					

** To be delivered at rate of one beginning July 1963, meaning that starting in July and for the next five months one additional J a month may be flown. As an alternative, depending on availability and the hypothesis that the additional Js have not been fired each month, as many as but not more than two additional can be fired in any one month.

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USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)
4 February 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : COMOR Recommendation on Satellite Scheduling

REFERENCES : (a) USIB-D-41.14/4, 28 January 1963
(b) USIB-M-253, 30 January 1963, item 3

The attached memorandum on satellite scheduling, which was developed by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) in response to a USIB request of 23 January (see reference (a)), has been placed on the agenda of the 6 February meeting for consideration and action on the COMOR recommendations in paragraph 8. Tab A of the paper is being forwarded only to USIB principals and their representatives on COMOR.

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Executive Secretary

Attachment: Subject paper.

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USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)

4 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: COMOR Recommendation on
Satellite Scheduling

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in pursuance of the request of the United States Intelligence Board (see USIB-D-41.14/4, COMOR-D-48/20) has, with the cooperation of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) reviewed the schedule for satellite photographic and electronic systems for the period through June 1964. Submitted as Tab A is a revision of the NRO schedule for satellite photographic and electronic systems. The COMOR recommendations on this are in paragraph 3 below.

2. Other actions pertinent to requirements guidance for the NRO are summarized as follows:

a. To assist in further research and development planning, a statement of the essential elements of information and the requirement for the resolution desired for satellite photography submitted to the NRO

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on 28 August 1962 (COMOR-D-61/1). This still

constitutes valid guidance for research and development.

b. With regard to the electronics systems section of the schedule, COMOR believes that at this time it will meet requirements. However, a new statement of requirements is in the process of preparation and will be forwarded as soon as completed.

c. COMOR has completed and forwarded to the D/NRO the targeting guidance for programming the L mission scheduled for February. COMOR will continue to provide specific guidance for each of these missions.

d. The USIB has notified NRO of the requirement for an ARGON mission in April to be followed by one in June if required.

3. In studying this program in cooperation with the NRO, COMOR was advised that the present schedule for photographic systems is not in competition with the electronic systems schedule or vice versa.

4. COMOR believes that, in evaluating the adequacy of the photographic systems schedule, the schedule for L [] programs is 25X1D adequate. These programs, it should be understood, are not a substitute for, but are complementary to, the M or J programs. Our document contains information []

USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)

needs for search and surveillance will be but little affected even if
the L [redacted] or both, are successful in coverage of high
priority targets. COMOR feels that inasmuch as the L program is
an interim and limited program, comment on it would not be construc-
tive.

[redacted]

this program after the second successful mission.

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5. Our present major concern in the photographic field,
therefore, is to evaluate the adequacy of the search and surveillance
program for which the M and J systems were designed. Experience
since the inception of the satellite program has furnished a basis for
determining the frequency of coverage in general needed to satisfy most
of our highest priority intelligence requirements using the present
system in operation. In establishing the intervals at which this coverage
should be obtained, the following factors were considered:

a. The average time lapses permissible in
coverage of the various types of targets,

b. The average optimum time lapses for
purposes of comparative coverage, and

c. The time required to process and interpret
the results of a mission to a degree which will permit

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(COMOR-D-48/21)

review of the highest priority objectives and revision or refinement of the target file and photo interpretation requirements.

6. The revised NRO schedule for the J-type satellite reflecting use of 4 of the spare systems as shown in the revision of Tab A is an adequate approach for satisfying the intelligence community requirement for a search and surveillance program conducted through satellite photography. (COMOR notes that failure of the J system would require the substitution of 2 M systems for every J in the schedule as revised if the requirement is to be met.) The revision takes into account the need for increasing surveillance during the good weather periods of 1963 and the first half of 1964, times which are optimum for maximum photographic collection. In summary, it should provide:

Note at Board meeting

- a. Potential coverage of priority targets at 10-day intervals during summer months when daylight and weather conditions are favorable;
- b. Potential coverage of priority targets at 15-day intervals during the winter months, when adverse weather conditions and inadequate daylight render missions less productive.

7. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has been concerned that there should be available on a continuing standby a

USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)

satellite reconnaissance capability for emergency, such as was faced by the United States Intelligence Board in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban crisis of 1962. It is COMOR's feeling that even under the best of circumstances, satellite reconnaissance both today and in the foreseeable future cannot produce information on a sufficiently timely basis to serve as an "indication source" as the term is normally used. However, in a continuing cold-war crisis period, even with the time lapse between launch and readout satellite reconnaissance can provide valuable intelligence information that could be critical in policy decisions. It is for this reason that COMOR submits for USIB consideration and approval the recommendation below in paragraph 8b.

8. Recommendations:

- consider* ~~sends~~ *that* ~~concur in~~ *if controlled by NRO + anything else* *higher on board would meet our requirement*
- a. That the United States Intelligence Board *concur in* the NRO schedule as revised (see Tab A). The additional missions proposed will provide needed intelligence coverage during the good-weather months (July and September) in 1963 and the good-weather months up to mid-64 (April and June).
- b. That a standby reconnaissance capability be provided for use on call in crisis situations. This satellite system should incorporate a vehicle programmed against the type of targets designated as

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ALL INFORMATION

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
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)

possible indicators during the tension last October

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[] 3684-62). These would be relatively few in number and the plan would be to program in such a manner as to cover a broad and representative selection of targets, and as many as possible, during each day's orbits. This capability should include provision for immediate replacement of vehicles fired and a means for these vehicles taking priority over other firings in the U.S. satellite schedule.



25X1A

James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment: "Schedule"--distributed only
to USIB members and COMOR members.

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ARGON

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USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)
4 February 1963
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 23--LS/PID(NPIC)
 24--TSO CIA
 25--DDI TCO
 26--OCI TCO
 27, 28--OSI TCO
 29--ORR TCO
 30--DDP TCO
 31--DDR TCO
 32--AD/OSA
 33--OD/OSA
 34--Intel/OSA
 35--SO/OSA
 36--SA/DDR
 37--SA/DDR
 38--SA/DDR
 39-50--DCI TCO for USIB/S

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(COMOR-D-48/21)

Tab A

COMOR Proposed Revision of the NRO Schedule
The revision is indicated by adding one more J package
in July & September 1963 and April & June 1964 (in red)

LAUNCH SCHEDULE

as of 22 Jan 1963

PHOTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS	CORONA "P"	10' Resolution general search	1	PAYLOAD SYSTEMS SPARES SPACES J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J 1963												
				J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J
	"J"	10' Resolution general search			2	***			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	"L"	5' Resolution specific coverage	3					1	1	1	1	1				
	ARGON	350' Resolution geodetic coverage	3					1	1	1	1	1				

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ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS	CORONA "P"	10' Resolution general search	1	PAYLOAD SYSTEMS SPARES SPACES J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A N J 1963												
				J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J
	"J"	10' Resolution general search														

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** To be delivered at rate of 1/mo beginning July 1963, meaning that starting in July and for the next five months one additional J a month may be flown. As an alternative, depending on availability and the hypothesis that the additional Js have not been fired each month, as many as but not more than two additional Js can be fired in any one month.

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USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)

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Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA [REDACTED]

5, 6, 7, 8 --DIA TCO

9--OACSI TCO

10--ONI TCO

11, 12--AFCIN TCO

13, 14--NSA TCO

15, 16--NRO TCO

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[REDACTED] ARGON/

/LANYARD [REDACTED]

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USIB-D-41.14/7
(COMOR-D-48/21)

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19--SA/DDR
20-28--USIB/S
29-50--SA/DDR

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subject to prior approval by MARCONI

(LANYARD)

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USIB-D-41.15/2
(COMOR-D-48/19)
28 January 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Resumption of ARGON Program

REFERENCES : (a) USIB-D-41.5/45, 26 December 1962
(b) USIB-D-41.15/1, 16 January 1963

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USIB, at its meeting on 23 January, considered the subject program and after an exchange of views, including discussion of the matter with Mr. Reber, Chairman, COMOR, Dr. Scoville, Deputy Director for Research/CIA, and [redacted] of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), took the following actions:

a. Noted, as reported by Mr. Reber:

(1) That NRO had advised that an ARGON mission could be scheduled for late April 1963 with no detriment to any currently scheduled mission for some other objective.

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(3) That an ARGON could be scheduled in June which might be in competition with a. [redacted]

b. Noted, as reported by [redacted]

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ARGON/CORONA

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USIB-D-41.15/2
(COMOR-D-48/19)
28 January 1963
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(1) That scheduling of ARGON launches in April and June 1963 would not conflict with programmed CORONA flights.

(2) That an April ARGON launch might entail a five-month delay in readiness for firing of a complete [REDACTED]

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(3) That, if an ARGON launch was scheduled for June, NRO might have to request a NASA release of the booster presently programmed for lifting an [REDACTED] at about that time.

.c. Agreed that the Chairman, USIB, should advise the Director, NRO, in a letter along the lines of a draft read by Mr. McCone; copy of the letter, as dispatched, is attached hereto. The record of USIB action relevant to the final paragraph of the letter is set forth in USIB-D-41.14/4, 25 January 1963.

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[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary ✓

Attachment

Copies to: Chairman, COMOR
Chairman, SIGINT Committee

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- 2 -

ARGON/CORONA

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USIB-D-41.15/2
(COMOR-D-48/19)
28 January 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Office of the Chairman

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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Resumption of the ARGON Program

1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) has reviewed its need for information to be derived from the ARGON and CORONA programs and recommends that ARGON launches be scheduled for April and June 1963 without interference with presently programmed CORONA launches. A representative of your Office, who was present during USIB discussion of this matter, advised that such a schedule of ARGON firings would not conflict with programmed CORONA flights.

2. The USIB has also agreed that if the first ARGON launch (in April) is successful, it will review the results of that mission with a view to confirming or withdrawing its recommendation concerning the June ARGON launch.

3. Following consideration of the specific launch schedule above, USIB requested that its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) develop for USIB consideration an up-to-date statement of intelligence requirements for satellite reconnaissance which would provide adequate guidance to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) over the next 18 months. It was understood in this connection that the NRO would provide COMOR with such information as is necessary to carry out this assignment.

/s/
JOHN A. McCONE
Chairman

26 January 1963

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28 January 1963
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	5, 6, 7, 8	DIA TCO
	9	OACSI TCO
	10	ONI TCO
	11, 12	AFCIN TCO
	13, 14	NSA TCO
	15	AEC
	16	FBI
	17	Chairman, COMOR
	18	Chairman, SIGINT Committee
	19, 20	NRO TCO

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- 4 -

CORONA/ARGON

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USIB -D-41, 15/2
(COMOR -D-48/19)
28 January 1963
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	27	C/CSD (NPIC)
	28	LS/PID/CIA (NPIC)
	29	OCI TCO
	30	ONE TCO
	31	ORR TCO
	32, 33	OSI TCO
	34	AD/OSA/DDR
	35	C/OPS/OSA/DDR
	36	Intel. /OSA/DDR
	37	SO/OSA/DDR
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USIB-D-41.15/1
(COMOR-D-48/18)
16 January 1963
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


SUBJECT : Resumption of the ARGON Program

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.5/45, 26 December 1962

1. Attached for information at Tab A is a summary report of initial vote sheet action by USIB on the COMOR recommendations in the reference regarding resumption and completion of the ARGON program. As indicated in that Tab, the CIA and State concurrence in the COMOR recommendations was subject to qualification.

2. In light thereof, the Secretariat informed COMOR on 10 January of the above-cited "voting" and requested that the members of that Committee (except CIA and State) determine whether or not their respective USIB principal accepted the CIA and State qualification on the subject matter. The responses to that request, as communicated to the USIB Secretariat, are set forth, in sum, in Tab B hereto, also for information.

3. Pursuant to the requests noted in Tab B, the subject matter will be placed on the agenda of the 23 January USIB meeting.



Executive Secretary

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
Attachments

cc: Chairman, COMOR

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CORONA/ARGON

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Tab A
USIB-D-41.15/1
(COMOR-D-48/18)
16 January 1963
Limited Distribution

Summary Report of
Initial USIB Vote Sheet Action on USIB -D-41.5/45

Members Concurring (without comment):

DIA	NSA
Army	Joint Staff
Navy	AEC
Air Force	FBI

Members Concurring (with comment):

CIA, subject to qualification quoted below:

"We are in favor of completing the ARGON program but consider that it should not be permitted to interfere with the two CORONA firings scheduled for March and April, at least not without further consideration by COMOR."

State, "subject to the finding that the proposed ARGON schedule will not significantly interfere with normally scheduled CORONA firings."

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Tab B
USIB-D-41.15/1
(COMOR-D-48/18)
16 January 1963
Limited Distribution

Summary Report of
Responses to Qualified Concurrence
of CIA and State in USIB-D-41.5/45

DIA

Reserves judgment on the CIA and State proviso and requests that the matter be placed on the agenda of a USIB meeting.

Army

Considers that USIB-D-41.5/45 should be placed on the USIB agenda.

Navy

Does not accept the CIA and State qualification.

Air Force

Reserves position since it is understood that DIA and Army have requested that the matter be placed on the USIB agenda.

NSA

Reserves final position in view of requests made for matter to be on USIB agenda, but would be inclined to accept CIA and State qualification in event that ARGON launchings would interfere with CORONA program.

Joint Staff

Does not concur in CIA and State proviso and requests that matter be placed on USIB agenda.

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CORONA/ARGON

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
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	11, 12	AFCIN TCO
	13, 14	NSA TCO
	15	AEC
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	17	Chairman, COMOR
	18, 19	NRO TCO

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25	C / PID (NPIC)
26	C/CSD (NPIC)
27	LS/PID/CIA (NPIC)
28	OCI TCO
29	ONE TCO
30	ORR TCO
31, 32	OSI TCO
33	AD/OSA/DDR
34	C/OPS/OSA/DDR
35	Intel. /OSA/DDR
36	SO/OSA/DDR
37	TSO/CIA
38-49	SA/DDR
50-65	DCI TCO (for USIB /S)

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USIB-D-41.5/45
(COMOR-D-48/17)
26 December 1962
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Resumption of the ARGON Program

REFERENCES: (a) USIB-D-41.5/23, 28 September 1962
(b) USIB-D-41.5/30, 11 October 1962
(c) USIB-D-41.5/34, 29 October 1962

1. Submitted herewith at Attachment A is a COMOR memorandum containing a recommendation for USIB consideration and vote sheet action.

2. USIB members are requested to indicate in Attachment B hereto either their concurrence in or other views on the COMOR recommendations in paragraph 4.a. and b. of its memorandum and return the vote sheet form to the Secretariat by close of business 7 January 1963.

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[redacted]
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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2, 3--State TCO
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9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI TCO
11, 12--AFCIN TCO
13, 14--NSA TCO
15, 16--NRO TCO
17--AEC
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19--Chairman, COMOR

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Attachment A

USIB-D-41.5/45

(COMOR-D-48/17)


20 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Resumption of the ARGON Program

1. On 21 October 1962, the United States Intelligence Board agreed to eliminate the one remaining ARGON mission, which had been scheduled for 30 October. This action had been prompted by a desire to obtain as much intelligence as possible on the world situation, in view of the then prevailing "Cuba Crisis." A CORONA mission accordingly was substituted for the canceled ARGON shot.

2. The effect of the action outlined above was to bring to a halt the program of data acquisition essential to completion of the ARGON project previously approved by USIB for 1962. The importance of this project, as well as the relative success of the two ARGON missions accomplished in May and October 1962 has already been established. The fact remains that, ideally, one additional mission, or more practically, two additional missions would obtain sufficient data to permit completion of the objectives for which ARGON was conceived.

3. In order to permit the operational agency to prepare its launch schedule for 1963, it seems appropriate that USIB restate the requirement at this time to complete the ARGON Program. A study has been completed by the Army which establishes 5 March and 1 April as optimum launch dates for the remaining shots. The technical parameters for these missions should be identical with those previously stated for the 9 October 1962 ARGON launch.



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CORONA/ARGON

USIB-D-41.5/45

(COMOR-D-48/17)

4. Recommendation: COMOR recommends that the Board recommend to (S) NRO:

a. One launch on or about 5 March 1963.

b. A second launch on or about 1 April.

(This second mission would not be required if optimum conditions, i.e., weather, orbit, systems functioning, prevailed during the March mission.)

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James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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CORONA/ARGON

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USIB-D-41.5/45

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COMORU D148/171

26 December 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

SUBJECT : USIB Vote Sheet Action

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.5/45, 26 December 1962,
Limited Distribution

1. With respect to the recommendations in
paragraphs 4. a. and b. of the reference:

a. I concur. _____

b. I concur, subject to the comments or
amendments set forth in paragraph
2 below.* _____

c. I do not concur. See comments
below.* _____

2. Comments or amendments:*

(Date)

(Signature)

(Title)

(Agency)

*May necessitate classification and
control of this memorandum.

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(COMOR-D-48/17)

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 23--C/PSD(NPIC)
 24--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
 25--TSO CIA
 26--DDI TCO
 27--OCI TCO
28,29--OSI TCO
 30--ORR TCO
 31--DDP TCO
 32--DDR
 33--AD/OSA
 34--Intel/OSA
 35--SO/OSA
36-38--C/SRS/DDR
40-54--DCI TCO for USIB/S
 55--ONE TCO
 39--C/CSD(NPIC)

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USIB-D-41.5/35
(COMOR-D-48/16)
7 November 1962
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : NRP Satellite Schedule

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.5/34, 29 October

1. The Board, at its meeting today, took the following actions on the subject matter:

a. Noted, with reference to a 6 November NRO staff memorandum which was distributed at the meeting [redacted] 4335-62), that the accelerated NRP satellite schedule for November-December 1962 continues to be the best that can be done during this period.

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b. Noted, as pointed out by Dr. Scoville, the following changes in the schedule set forth in a DRNO memorandum of 24 October (Attachment to USIB-D-41.5/32, 25 October):

(1) CM-14
5 November

(2) CM-15
21 November

2. In light of the Board action recorded in 1.a. above, the USIB will not be asked to review the subject schedule on a weekly basis as had been requested by the State Department member (see paragraph 1 of the reference).

3. With further reference to the NRO memorandum cited in 1.a. above, the attention of Board members is invited to a supplementary

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USIB-D-41.5/35
(COMOR-D-48/16)
7 November 1962
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memorandum from that Office (received after adjournment of the USIB meeting today) advising of a further revision in the NRP satellite schedule for the remainder of CY 62. No additional USIB action will be requested on this revised schedule, unless a Board member submits a specific proposal therefor.

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Copy 1..... DCI TCO
2, 3..... State TCO
4..... DIA [REDACTED]
5, 6, 7, 8.. DIA TCO
9..... OACSI TCO
10..... ONI TCO
11, 12..... AFCIN TCO
13, 14..... NSA TCO
15..... AEC
16..... FBI
17..... Chairman, SIGINT
Committee
18..... Chairman, COMOR
34..... NRO TCO

25X1A

- 2 -

HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]
CONTROL SYSTEM

CORONA/MURAL/
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CORONA/MURAL/

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HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]
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Attachment
USIB-D-41.5/35
(COMOR-D-48/16)
7 November 1962
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington

Office of the Secretary

7 November 1962

25X1
NRO

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMOR, USIB

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] NRP (Satellite) Schedule

Further to my memo of 6 November on the above subject noting that the best accelerated schedule that can be done during the November-December period remains two CORONA-MURALS [REDACTED] in November and two CORONA-MURALS in December, we are presently working toward the following specific launch dates:

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b. PHOTO

November

CM-14
launched 5 Nov

December

CM-16
5 Dec

CM-15
21 Nov

CM-17
14 Dec


25X1D

The above schedule differs slightly from the estimates given in the Director's 24 Oct memo for the Chairman, USIB in that CM-14 slipped [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CM-15 is now scheduled for 21 Nov as opposed to 15 Nov in the cited memo, and CM-17 is now

25X1D

- 3 -

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CORONA/MURAL/

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Attachment
USIB-D-41.5/35
(COMOR-D-48/16)
7 November 1962
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scheduled for 14 Dec rather than 10 Dec. The change in CM-17 and CM-15 of approximately three days is due to more refined determination of the precise schedule than was possible at the time of the submission of the Director's 24 Oct memo. In addition, the slippage of CM-14 has added directly to slippage for CM-15, since both of these vehicles employ an Agena B which presently must be fired from the same pad.

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[REDACTED]
Colonel, USAF
Director, NRO Staff

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HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]
CONTROL SYSTEM

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USIB-D-41.5/35
(COMOR-D-48/16)
7 November 1962
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Copy 19..... DDI TCO
20..... DDP TCO
21..... DDR
22..... DIR NPIC
23..... C/DMD/NPIC
24..... C/CIA/PAD/NPIC
25..... LS/CIA/PAD/NPIC
26..... ONE TCO
27..... OCI TCO
28..... OSI TCO
29..... ORR TCO
30..... AD/OSA/DDR
31..... Intel/OSA/DDR
32..... SO/OSA/DDR
33..... TSO CIA
36-48.... C/SRS/DDR
49-63.... DCI TCO (for USIB/S)
35..... OSI TCO

- 5 -

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USIB-D-41.5/34
(COMOR-D-48/15)
29 October 1962
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HANDLE VIA [] CONTROL SYSTEM

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : NRP (Satellite) Schedule

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.5/32 (COMOR-D-48/14), 25 October 1962

1. The United States Intelligence Board, as of 26 October 1962, concurred in the satellite reconnaissance schedule for the remainder of CY 1962 contained in the first paragraph of the memorandum from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in the attachment to the reference. The State Department member of the USIB, however, concurred with the provision that the proposed scheduling should be reviewed weekly by USIB in the light of the present crisis.

2. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, has been advised of the above USIB concurrence as shown in the attached memorandum.

3. In accordance with the request of the State member, it is planned to include a review of the above mentioned schedule on the agenda of the USIB meeting for next week (7 November), based on any comments or recommendations which the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance is being requested to submit prior to that meeting.

[] Executive Secretary

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Attachment

Copies:

- 2,3 - State TCO
- 4 - DIA []
- 5,6,7,8 - DIA TCO
- 9 - OACSI TCO
- 10 - ONI TCO
- 11,12 - AFCIN TCO
- 13,14 - NSA TCO
- 15 - NRO TCO

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CORONA/ARGON/ [redacted]

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HANDLE VIA [redacted]

CONTROL SYSTEM

ATTACHMENT

29 October 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT : NRP (Satellite) Schedule

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Chairman, USIB from Director,
National Reconnaissance Office, same subject,
24 October 1962

1. In response to reference memorandum, the United States Intelligence Board has reviewed the modified satellite reconnaissance schedule for the remainder of CY 1962, in the light of the following USIB action on 21 October 1962 which was communicated to you by Dr. Scoville:

"The Board agreed that in the present circumstances CORONA coverage should be expedited, and that in order to achieve three CORONA missions in November, a scheduled ARGON mission would be eliminated. [redacted]
scheduled for 24 November will be retained. One CORONA package is, therefore, available for use in December or later."

25X1A

2. Under the circumstances, the United States Intelligence Board has concurred in the schedule contained in the first paragraph of the referenced memorandum.

3. This memorandum confirms my telephone message to [redacted] on 26 October advising NRO of the above USIB concurrence.

/S/

[redacted]
Executive Secretary

HANDLE VIA [redacted] CONTROL SYSTEM

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CORONA/ARGON

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USIB-D-41.5/34
(COMOR-D-48/15)
29 October 1962
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- 19 - LS/CIA/PAD (NPIC)
- 20 - TSO CIA
- 21 - DDI TCO
- 22 - OCI TCO
- 23 - OSI TCO
- 24 - ORR TCO
- 25 - DDP TCO
- 26 - DDR
- 27 - AD/OSA
- 28 - Intel/OSA
- 29 - SO/OSA
- 30-32 - C/SRS/DDR
- 33-42 - DCI TCO for USIB/S

-3-

HANDLE VIA [REDACTED] CONTROL SYSTEM

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COMOR *See file*

25X1A

USIB-D-41.5/32
(COMOR-D-48/14)

25 October 1962

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HANDLE VIA [] CONTROL SYSTEM

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

REFERENCE: CCPC-D-1/62 dated 22 October 1962 (SC-10888/62)

1. The attached memorandum on the subject for the Chairman, USIB, from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, is circulated herewith for Board consideration.

2. The action of the USIB on this subject at its meeting on 21 October 1962 (recorded in the reference and communicated on that date by Dr. Scoville to Dr. Charyk) is quoted below:

"The Board agreed that in the present circumstances CORONA coverage should be expedited, and that in order to achieve three CORONA missions in November, a scheduled ARGON mission would be eliminated." []

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25X1D

[] One CORONA package is, therefore, available for use in December or later."

3. It is noted that the schedule in the attached memorandum is consistent with the general objective of USIB that CORONA coverage be expedited (the 2nd November mission is earlier than anticipated at the 21 October Board meeting.) However, it provides only two CORONA missions in November and two in December, rather than three in November and one in December.

4. Under the circumstances, it is requested that USIB members indicate their concurrence in or other views on the schedule in the attached memorandum, by telephone to the Secretariat by the close of business, 26 October.

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Attachment

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Executive Secretary
HANDLE VIA [] CONTROL SYSTEM

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HANDLE VIA [REDACTED] CONTROL SYSTEM

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington

Office of the Under Secretary

October 24, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USIB


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NRO

SUBJECT : [REDACTED] NRP (Satellite) Schedule

Reference: Memo for Chairman, USIB, same subject, 18 Oct 62

In view of the absence of a reply to the referenced memorandum but on the basis of informal discussions and [REDACTED] NRO evaluation of the program options and resulting effects, the satellite reconnaissance schedule for the remainder of CY 62 has been modified as follows:

25X1D



b. PHOTO

November

CM-14
2 Nov

December

CM-16
6 Dec

CM-15
15 Nov
201/5

CM-17
10 Dec
201/8

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It is possible to launch three CORONA payloads in November 1962.

[REDACTED]

Actions are being taken to reduce the normal lead times for payload flexibility for CY 63 so that minimum time is required to respond to an urgent requirement as specified by USIB.

Above information not releasable in T/KH Security Systems.

/s/

JOSEPH V. CHARYK
Director

[REDACTED] National Reconnaissance Office

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MANAGED VIA [REDACTED] CONTROL SYSTEM

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2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA [redacted]
5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO
9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI TCO
11, 12--AFCIN TCO
13, 14--NSA TCO
15--NRO TCO

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HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]

CONTROL SYSTEM

CORONA/ARGON [REDACTED]

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USIB-D-41.5/32
(COMOR-D-48/14)

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- 17--C/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
- 18--C/DMD/NPIC
- 19--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
- 20--TSO CIA
- 21--DDI TCO
- 22--OCI TCO
- 23--OSI TCO
- 24--ORR TCO
- 25--DDP TCO
- 26--DDR
- 27--AD/OSA
- 28--Intel/OSA
- 29--SO/OSA
- 30-32--C/SRS/DDR
- 33-42--DCI TCO for USIB/S

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CORONA/ARGON [REDACTED]

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CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

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*Corona
Argon*

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[redacted] Controls

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CORONA/ARGON/[redacted]

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COMOR-D-48/13

22 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Scheduling of ARGON, CORONA,
[redacted]

25X1A

1. Attached is a memorandum on the above subject approved by the COMOR at its 19 October meeting. It was taken to the 20 October Board meeting but no action was taken at that time.

2. Subsequently on 21 October the United States Intelligence Board, I am informed, made a decision to cancel the ARGON program and substitute a CORONA mission.

3. This memorandum is distributed for the record.

25X1A

[redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:

19 Oct. memo to USIB

25X1A

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA [redacted]

5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO

9--OACSI TCO

10--ONI TCO

11, 12--AFCIN TCO

13, 14--NSA TCO

15--NRO TCO

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TOP SECRET

Controls

CORONA/ARGON

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Coron-D 48/13

19 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Scheduling of ARGON, CORONA,

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25X1A

1. The NRO has requested the Board to reconfirm or to recommend change in the current scheduling for CORONA, [redacted] ARGON, and [redacted] satellite reconnaissance operations. This request is apparently prompted by the possible relevance in the current and prospective international situation of CORONA satellite photography being obtained earlier than presently scheduled as well as the possible need for more CORONA missions than presently scheduled. The United States Intelligence Board at its meeting on 19 October considered this question but reached no conclusion. The Board felt that more information was necessary with regard to the relevance of [redacted]

2. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance considered the scheduling question further on the afternoon of 19 October and submits below information which it believes the Board will find useful in reaching a conclusion. Inasmuch as the Board is well informed on the importance of the ARGON mission now scheduled for 30 October, no further analysis of the importance of that mission is included in this paper. It is noted, however, that a decision to substitute a CORONA for the 30 October ARGON would require a 14-day delay from the time of decision.

3. The current schedule is as follows:

ARGON

30 October

CORONA

15 November

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CORONA/ARGON/[redacted]

[redacted]
CORONA 14 December.

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4. It should be noted that the [redacted] photographic mission scheduled for 8 November is not of concern inasmuch as its booster could not be used for an additional CORONA mission. It is, of course, relevant to the possible acquisition of photographic information during its one-day orbit in the same way though perhaps in less degree, as a CORONA mission.

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CORONA/ARGON Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE

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TOP SECRET
 CORONA/ARGON

25X1D

8. The case for both an earlier and an additional CORONA mission rests on the thesis that information might thus be obtained during this critical period which would give some indication of Soviet military moves either in anticipation of U.S. military action against Cuba or in response to such action were it to occur. Soviet military moves might be directed at peripheral areas ranging from Berlin through the Middle East. Informally a representative of the National Indications Center has suggested that, with the present base line on the USSR (established from CORONA photography and other sources), additional photography might produce information on key indicators such as the long range air force, submarine deployment, and possibly rail traffic. Military representatives on COMOR were doubtful that meaningful indications information of this sort could be thus obtained. Some felt that the long shot chance should be taken even if the possibility of success is marginal. The 10-day delay after firing and before the information could be available (assuming successful recovery) argues against the effectiveness of the use of CORONA as an early warning collector.

9. The options available are:

a. Reconfirm the schedule set forth in paragraph 3.

b. Increase the number of CORONA shots during the remainder of 1962 from 2 to 3 or 4 through cancelling any one or two of the missions planned for ARGON. [redacted]

c. Hasten the acquisition of CORONA photography through the substitution of CORONA for the 30 October ARGON mission and/or the postponement [redacted] until December and the substitution of the CORONA therefor.


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10. Recommendation: The COMOR recommends in the light of the foregoing that the present schedule set forth in paragraph 3 be reaffirmed.*

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Copies 2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA [redacted]
5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO
9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI TCO
11, 12--AFCIN TCO
13, 14--NSA TCO

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CORONA/ARGON [redacted]

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Controls

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CORONA/ARGON/[redacted]

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17--C/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
18--C/DMD/NPIC
19--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
20--TSO CIA
21--DDI TCO
22--OCI TCO
23--OSI TCO
24--ORR TCO
25--DDP TCO
26--DDR
27--AD/OSA
28--Intel/OSA
29--SO/OSA
30--50--C/SRS/DDR

-2-

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CORONA/ARGON

USIB-D-41.5/30
(COMOR-D-48/12)
11 October 1962
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U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T E L L I G E N C E B O A R D

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.5/23 (COMOR-D-48/11) dated 28 September 1962

1. All members of the United States Intelligence Board have concurred as of 10 October 1962 in the COMOR report circulated by the reference, subject to the deletion at the request of COMOR of the last sentence in paragraph 2 of Tab A to the reference.

2. Accordingly the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, has been informed of this USIB response to his memorandum in Tab B of the reference. A copy of the memorandum to the Director, NRO, is attached hereto for information and record.

[Redacted]

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Executive Secretary

Attachment: Subject Paper

25X1A

Copy 1--NRO TCO for DNRO
2,3--State TCO
4--DIA [Redacted]
5,6,7,8--DIA TCO
9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI TCO
11,12--AFCIN TCO
13,14--NSA TCO
15--DCI TCO
16--Chairman, SIGINT
17--Chairman, COMOR
18--NRO TCO for DNRO

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[Redacted]

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CORONA/ARGON

Attachment

USIB-D-41.5/30


(COMOR-D-48/12)

11 October 1962

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11 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office


SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Chairman, USIB, from Director,
NRO, same subject, dated 13 September 1962

In response to your request in the reference memorandum for comments on the satellite schedule for the remainder of Calendar Year 62, the United States Intelligence Board has approved a report by its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance which recommends the schedule with the following qualification on A-8:

Because there was some question as to how late ARGON could be used effectively to obtain geodetic position information in the USSR, the Defense Intelligence Agency was requested to submit a study on this aspect. Based on this study, it appears that good information can be obtained on the USSR this year until 9 November. COMOR therefore recommends that the firing date for A-8 be permitted to slide as late as 5 November but not later. COMOR further recommends at any time a determination is made that A-8 cannot be fired by 5 November, a CORONA package be substituted as soon thereafter as possible. COMOR notes that geodetic position data can be obtained in the southern hemisphere, although not the USSR, after 9 November but considers that this much less important than obtaining the intelligence information which could result from a CORONA package.

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Executive Secretary

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CORONA/ARGON




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


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(COMOR-D-48/12)
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25--OCI TCO
26--OSI TCO
27--ORR TCO
28--DDP TCO
29--DDR
30--AD/OSA
31--Intel/OSA
32--SO/OSA
33-44--DCI TCO for USIB/s
45-50--C/SRS/DDR

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CORONA/ARGON

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USIB-D-41.5/23
(COMOR-D-48/11)
28 September 1962
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: NRP Satellite Schedule

1. The attached COMOR report on the subject matter (at Tab A), which is responsive to an NRO request (see Tab B), is forwarded for USIB consideration and action through the procedure indicated below.

2. Board members are requested to advise the Secretariat no later than the close of business on 1 October of either their concurrence in or other views on the COMOR recommendation as set forth therein.

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[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Copies:

2, 3--State TCO

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5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO

9--OACSI TCO

10--ONI TCO

11, 12--AFCIN TCO

13, 14--NSA TCO

15--DCI TCO (for USIB/S)

16--AEC

17--FBI

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[REDACTED]
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CORONA/ARGON

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HANDLE VIA TALENT
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[redacted]

Tab A
USIB-D-41.5/23
(COMOR-D-48/11)

28 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: NRP Satellite Schedule

REFERENCE: COMOR-D-48/10 (TCS-13529-62-KH)

1. In accordance with Dr. Charyk's request that the satellite schedule for September, October, November, and December be considered by the United States Intelligence Board, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has reviewed the schedule and recommends it with a qualification on A-8.

2. Because there was some question as to how late ARGON could be used effectively to obtain geodetic position information in the USSR, the Defense Intelligence Agency was requested to submit a study on this aspect. Based on this study, it appears that good information can be obtained on the USSR this year until 9 November. COMOR therefore recommends that the firing date for A-8 be permitted to slide as late as 5 November but not later. COMOR further recommends that at any time a determination is made that A-8 cannot be fired by 5 November, a CORONA package be substituted as soon thereafter as possible. COMOR notes that geodetic position data can be obtained in the southern hemisphere, although not the USSR, after 9 November but considers that this much less important than obtaining the intelligence information which could result from a CORONA package. In making this recommendation COMOR noted that no CORONA is scheduled for October, but that the high priority area of Kamchatka normally enjoys the best weather conditions of the year from the middle of October to early in November.



Acting Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Tab B
USIB-D-41.5/23
(COMOR-D-48/11)
28 September 1962

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington

Office of the Under Secretary

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USIB

25X1
NRO
SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

1. The satellite reconnaissance schedule for the remainder of CY 62 follows:

a. Photo	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	
	C-M12*	A-7***	C-M14	C-M15	
	14 Sep	2 Oct	Mid-Nov		

25X1D

25X1D

* Hold for Kamchatka weather can extend this launch up to 2230Z 18 Sep.

***A-7 and A-8 slip day for day with C-M12 launch beyond 14 Sep.


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Tab B
USIB -D-41.5/23
(COMOR -D-48/11)
28 September 1962

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Nov



to a C-M mission (lead time 5 days).

2. Your comments are requested with respect to the above schedules.

(Signed)
Joseph V. Charyk
Director
 National Reconnaissance Office 25X1

13 September 1962

**** First thrust assisted Thor. Booster committed to this configuration.
Cannot be launched as a standard Thor.

HANDLE VIA



CONTROL SYSTEM ~~25X1A~~



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HANDLE VIA TALENT- CORONA/ARGON

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HANDLE VIA TALENT-
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USIB-D-41.5/23
(COMOR-D-48/11)

Copy: 1--DCI TCO
18,19--DIR NPIC
20--C/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
21--C/DMD/NPIC
22--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
23--TSO CIA
24--DDI TCO
25--OCI TCO
26--OSI TCO
27--ORR TCO
28--DDP TCO
29--DDR
30--AD/OSA
31--Intel/OSA
32--SO/OSA
33- 35--C/SRS/OSA/DDR
36- 45--DCI TCO (for USIB/S)

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CORONA/ARGON KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY
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HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

COMOR-D-48/10

18 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

25X1
1. Attached for consideration of the COMOR at its meeting on Thursday, 20 September, is a memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the United States Intelligence Board transmitting a memorandum from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office on the above subject.

2. It would be appreciated if the members would come prepared to reflect the views of their principals. It is proposed unless there is an issue unresolved by the COMOR that this paper would not go to the USIB for consideration.


James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

25X1A



Attachments:
Subject Papers

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA

5,6, 7, 8--DIA TCO

9--OACSI TCO


10--ONI TCO

11, 12--AFCIN TCO

13, 14--NSA TCO

15--NRO TCO

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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COMOR-D-48/10

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
17 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chairman, USIB, from DNRO,
same subject, dated 13 September 1962

1. The reference memorandum (copy attached) is referred herewith to the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to prepare for consideration by the Chairman, USIB, a proposed response to the request for comments contained in paragraph 2 thereof.

2. In the interests of expeditious action, it is suggested that each COMOR member be requested to obtain and reflect the views of his USIB member with respect to the response to Dr. Charyk's memorandum.

(Signed)

[Redacted]

Executive Secretary

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Attachment:

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HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

COMOR-D-48/10

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington

Office of the Under Secretary

13 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USIB

25X1
NRO

SUBJECT: NRP (Satellite) Schedule

1. The satellite reconnaissance schedule for the remainder of CY 62 follows:

a.	<u>Photo</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
	C-M12*	A-7***	C-M14	C-M15	
	14 Sep	2 Oct	Mid Nov		
	C-M13**	A-8***	---	---	
	22 Sep	25 Oct			

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

*Hold for Kamchatka weather can extend this launch up to 2230Z 18 Sep.

***A-7 and A-8 slip day for day with C-M12 launch beyond 14 Sep.

****First thrust assisted Thor. Booster committed to this configuration. Cannot be launched as a standard Thor.

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HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

COMOR-D-48/10

25X1D

[redacted] and A-7 or

A-8 to a C-M mission (lead time 5 days).

2. Your comments are requested with respect to the
above schedules.

(Signed)

Joseph V. Charyk
Director
[redacted] National Reconnaissance Office

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NRO

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COMOR-D-48/9

COMOR
General file

5 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: CORONA Coverage of the ABM
Installations on Kamchatka

Attached for the information and reference of COMOR/A are two papers dealing with the above subject. Tab B is a memorandum from the Director/DIA proposing maximum effort to secure CORONA coverage of the anti-ballistic missile bases on Kamchatka. Tab A is an approved COMOR paper responsive to General Carroll's proposal. This was approved at the COMOR meeting on 5 September (see COMOR-M-103, paragraph 3). The memorandum was forwarded the same day to the D/NRO.

25X1A



James Q. Keeler
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments:
Subject papers

Copies:

2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA [REDACTED]
5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO
9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI TCO
11, 12--AFCIN TCO
13, 14--NSA TCO

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CORONA

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CORONA

COMOR-D-48/9
TAB-A

CORONA Coverage of the ABM
Installations on Kamchatka

1. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency has submitted to the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) a proposal that September CORONA missions conducted, if feasible operationally, when weather is favorable to cover the anti-ballistic missile installations on Kamchatka.

2. The COMOR noted the fact that requirements for coverage of the ABM facilities on Kamchatka have not been met despite coverage of the area by 17 CORONA missions.

3. The COMOR took note of certain operational factors:

a. That the weather over this area of Kamchatka improves in October and November but it is still marginal for photography.

b. That change of inclination angle from 82° to 65° must be accomplished 35 days before launch.

4. The COMOR concludes:

a. That the ABM installations on Kamchatka are currently the highest priority targets for CORONA coverage in all of the Soviet.

b. That a maximum effort should be made to obtain CORONA coverage of the ABM installations on Kamchatka in October or early November 1962.

5. Recommendation: That, at the earliest opportunity, a CORONA shot subsequent to the one now scheduled for 8 September be so fired as to provide maximum probability of successful photography of ABM targets on Kamchatka.

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CORONA

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COMOR-D-48/9
TAB-B

SUBJECT: Requirement for Special Scheduling of CORONA Mission

TO: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

1. The Department of Defense continues to have an overriding and pressing requirement for information on the nature and threat of the Soviet AMM program. Of particular concern is the large void that exists with respect to the Soviet AICBM program. This information is urgently needed at this time in order to accurately gauge the threat to our ICBM program, as well as to insure that adequate lead time is maintained in developing suitable countermeasures and new weapon systems.

25X1B

2. While we appreciate that determination of the extent of the Soviet capability in this field is the Priority National Intelligence

[redacted]

25X1B

[redacted]

5. A plan is presently being considered to help solve this problem using the FIRE FLY reconnaissance drone. This system has the potential to answer some of our questions on the peninsula, but its area coverage is limited as compared with KEYHOLE.

[redacted]
[redacted]

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CORONA
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CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

CORONA

COMOR-D-48/9
TAB-B

FIRE FLY's advantages are the ability to react quickly to predictions of fair weather and to provide photography of quality. The employment of FIRE FLY would be greatly enhanced, however, if we had good KEYHOLE coverage to provide better guidance in mission planning.

6. It is our understanding that our ability to predict weather in the Kamchatka area is good. If this is so, it may be possible to provide a higher probability of coverage of the Kamchatka AICBM area by holding the CORONA missions scheduled for September for a time when good weather is predicted. If this is possible, we may be able to add significantly to our knowledge of the Soviet AICBM program.

7. We also understand, on the basis of past CORONA briefings, that holding a mission for good weather in one area will not interfere with coverage of the other highest priority objectives on the COMOR list.

8. In view of the urgency of this requirement, it is requested that OPCEN/NRO review the operational factors involved, with a view to determining the feasibility of launching a CORONA mission when weather over the Kamchatka peninsula is most favorable. If such an operation is determined to be feasible, it is recommended that a proposal be made to the USIB with a view to accomplishing this in conjunction with the presently scheduled September missions.

1 Atch (TAB-C)
Summary of KH Coverage of
Kamchatka Peninsula

Joseph F. Carroll
Director Defense Intelligence Agency

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CORONA

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COMOR-D-48/9
 TAB-C

SUMMARY OF KEYHOLE COVERAGE OF THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA

25X1D

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COVER</u>	<u>INTELLIGENCE</u>
9009	18 Aug 60		
9013	10 Dec 60		
9017	19 Jun 61		
9019	9 Jul 61		
9023	1 Sep 61		
9022	14 Sep 61		
9025	14 Oct 61		
9028	17 Nov 61		
9029	16 Dec 61		
9031	3 Mar 62		
9032	19 Apr 62		
9035	30 May 62		
9037	23 June 62		
9038	28 June 62		
9039	21 July 62		
9040	31 July 62		
9041	6 Aug 62		

[redacted]
 [redacted]

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CORONA

COMOR-D-48/9

Copy 1--DCI TCO
15, 16--DIR NPIC
17--C/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
18--C/DMD/NPIC
19--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
20--TSO CIA
21--DDI TCO
22--OCI TCO
23--OSI TCO
24--ORR TCO
25--DDP TCO
26--DDR
27--AD/OSA
28--Intel/OSA
29--SO/OSA
30-33--C/SRS/OSA/DDR

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CORONA

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ARGON
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Comor Gen file
USIB-D-41.5/13
(COMOR-D-48/8
Limited Distribution
13 August 1962

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: ARGON Scheduling

REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-41.5/5 (COMOR-D-48/6) 27 Jun 62
b. USIB-D-41.5/10 (COMOR-D-48/7) 27 Jul 62

1. The attached memorandum from the Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, reporting the current COMOR agreements as to the scheduling of the ARGON shots in August and September, is circulated herewith to the USIB for record purposes as an addendum to reference b.

2. The change in the CIA position reflected in the attached memorandum has been concurred in by General Carter and approved by the Chairman of USIB.

3. Accordingly, a copy of the attached memorandum has been forwarded to Dr. Scoville as recommended in paragraph 4 thereof.

25X1A

Executive Secretary ✓

Attachment:

Addendum to TCS-12954-62-KH

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA []

5, 6, 7--DIA TCO

8--OACSI TCO

9--ONI TCO

10, 11--AFCIN TCO

12, 13--Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP75B00621R000100140001-1 SYSTEM

14, 15--AEC & FBI

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Addendum to:
USIB-D-41.5/10
(COMOR-D-48/7)

7 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: ARGON Scheduling

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.5/10; COMOR-D-48/7

1. On 9 July the Chairman, COMOR, informed its members of the CIA comment on the vote slip on the above subject (see reference) recommending a shot early in August and a COMOR look at the results as an aid to the original September scheduling. On 26 July the COMOR again discussed the ARGON schedule, with recognition of the fact that the ARGON could not go early in August. This late scheduling would not, therefore, permit COMOR to evaluate the August shot and then schedule for September.

2. Consequently COMOR agreed that the September firing should be scheduled and that the Army report on the August shot would guide COMOR in its consideration of a final firing (late September or early October) in 1962.

3. In view of the fact that the change in the CIA position was not reflected in the referenced publication because of the time sequence, it is now proposed that the USIB record be set straight through the issuance of this memorandum to the Board as an addendum to the reference.

4. It is recommended that you endorse this memorandum and forward it to the Project Director for ARGON, Dr. Scoville, as a formal means of recommending the scheduling of ARGON shots set forth in paragraph 2 above.

(Signed)

James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

CONCUR:

(Signed)

8 August 1962

Executive Secretary Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP75B00621R000100140001-1

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ARGON KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

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KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

ARGON

USIB-D-41, 5/13
(COMOR-D-48/8)

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17--C/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
18--C/DMD/NPIC
19--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
20--TSO CIA
21¹DDI TCO
22--OCI TCO
23--OSI TCO
24--ORR TCO
25, 26--DDP TCO
27--DDR
28--AD/OSA
29--Intel/OSA
30--SO/OSA
31- 45--C/SRS/OSA/DDR

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KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

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COMOR General file

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USIB-D-41.5/10
(COMOR-D-48/7)
27 July 1962
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the First ARGON Mission
and Proposed Future Schedule

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.5/5 (COMOR-D-48/6) dtd 27 Jun 62

1. As of 20 July 1962, all Intelligence Board members, by vote sheet action in response to the reference, have concurred (subject to the modification outlined in paragraph 2 below, as approved by the Chairman) in the COMOR recommendations in paragraph 6 of that paper. The FBI representative abstained from voting; the AEC representative stated that he had no comment; the State member advised that he had no objection.

2. The CIA in communicating its concurrence on this matter:

a. Noted that the ARGON package would not be ready in July, thus negating need at this time for consideration of substituting an ARGON shot for a CORONA shot as recommended in paragraph 6a in the reference.

b. Agreed on an ARGON shot in August.

c. Proposed that the question of scheduling in September be reconsidered after the August shot.

3. Accordingly, it is noted for record purposes that USIB on 20 July approved the recommendations in the reference subject to the afore-described modification.

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HANDLE VIA TALENT CORONA/ARGON
KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY [redacted]


USIB-D-41.5/10
(COMOR-D-48/7)

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4. Pursuant thereto:

a. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office has been requested to schedule an ARGON mission in August.

b. The COMOR will, at the appropriate time, submit to USIB for consideration and approval, its further views and recommendations with respect to the scheduling of an ARGON in September.



Executive Secretary ✓

25X1A

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA [redacted]

5, 6, 7--DIA TCO

8--OACSI TCO

9--ONI TCO

10, 11--AFCIN TCO

12, 13--NSA TCO

14, 15--AEC & FBI

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CORONA/ARGON KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

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17--C/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
18--C/DMD/NPIC
19--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
20--TSO CIA
21--DDI(P) TCO
22--OCI TCO
23--OSI TCO
24--ORR TCO
25, 26--DDP TCO
27--DDR
28--AD/OSA
29--Intel/OSA
30--SO/OSA
31-45--C/SRS/OSA/DDR

3

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c/srs COMOR gen file

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USIB-D-41.5/5
(C OMOR-D-48/6)
27 June 1962
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the First ARGON Mission
and Proposed Future Schedule

1. Attached hereto are recommendations of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance on the future schedule of ARGON missions for the approval of the United States Intelligence Board.

2. Members of the USIB are requested to advise the office of the Executive Secretary by the close of business 6 July whether they concur or non-concur in this document. If no objection is received by that date, the document will be considered approved by the Board.

25X1A

Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Subject Paper

Copies 2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA [redacted]
5, 6, 7--DIA TCO
8--OACSI TCO
9--ONI TCO
10, 11--AFCIN TCO
12, 13--NSA TCO
14, 15--AEC & FBI

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USIB-D-41.5/5
(COMOR-D-48/6)


MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the First ARGON Mission
and Proposed Future Schedule

1. The United States Intelligence Board recommended in COMOR-D-48/4, 19 March 1962, that one ARGON shot be scheduled in May and subsequent thereto scheduling of a second ARGON mission be subject to a review by COMOR in the light of all relevant factors, including the performance of the first ARGON mission.

2. The first ARGON mission was successfully recovered on 19 May 1962. Preliminary evaluation of the mission is as indicated below:

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CORONA/ARGON KEYHOLE SYSTEM ONLY

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USIB-D-41.5/5
(COMOR-D-48/6)

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23--OSI TCO
24--ORR TCO
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27--DDR
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29--Intel/OSA
30--SO/OSA
31-45--C/SRS/OSA

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HANDLE VIA TALENT CORONA/ARGON
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COMOR-D-48/5

18 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the First ARGON Mission
and Proposed Future Schedule

Attached is the revised draft of the Army paper
[redacted] of 14 June 1962 on the same subject. It is
proposed for final consideration by the COMOR for the next
meeting, Thursday, 21 June, and if approved, dissemination
to the United States Intelligence Board for its approval by
vote slip.

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[redacted]
James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject Paper

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA [redacted]

5,6, 7--DIA TCO

8--OACSI TCO

9--ONI TCO

10, 11--AFCIN TCO

12, 13--NSA TCO

14, 15--for AEC & FBI

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downgrading and declassification

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COMOR-D-48/5

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the First ARGON Mission
and Proposed Future Schedule

1. The United States Intelligence Board recommended in COMOR-D-48/4, 19 March 1962, that one ARGON shot be scheduled in May and subsequent thereto scheduling of a second ARGON mission be subject to a review by COMOR in the light of all relevant factors, including the performance of the first ARGON mission.

2. The first ARGON mission was successfully recovered on 19 May 1962. Preliminary evaluation of the mission is as indicated below:

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COMOR-D-48/5

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 26--ORR TCO
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 31--Intel/DPD
 32--SO/DPD
 33-50--C/SRS/DPD

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HANDLE VIA TALENT CORONA/ARGON
CONTROL SYSTEM

COMOR-D-48/4

19 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON
Missions: Conclusion

1. This memorandum is for the record and to report that the United States Intelligence Board on 7 March approved the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommendations as submitted in COMOR-D-48/3.

2. On 15 March the Special Group concurred in the recommendations.




James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Copies 2, 3--State
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5, 6--DIA TCO
7, 8--OACSI TCO
9--ONI TCO
10, 11, 12--AFCIN TCO
13, 14--NSA TCO



CORONA/ARGON

CONTROL SYSTEM

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 23--C/DMD/NPIC
 24--LS/CIA/PAD (NPIC)
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 26--Intel/DPD
 27--SO/DPD
 28 - 30--C/SRS/DPD/DDP

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CORONA/ARGON

COMOR-D-48/3

27 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions

1. Attached is a paper on the above subject approved by COMOR at its meeting of 26 February. It is tentatively scheduled to appear on the United States Intelligence Board agenda of 7 March.

2. The Chairman has informed the Executive Secretary of the Board that the attached document will be brought to the attention of the members of the Board by their respective representatives on the COMOR when this item is scheduled for Board consideration. There will be no other distribution of this document.

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[Redacted]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject paper.

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA [Redacted]

5, 6-- DIA TCO

7, 8-- OACSI TCO

9--ONI TCO

10, 11, 12-- AFCIN TCO

13, 14-- NSA TCO

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HANDLE VIA TALENT CORONA/ARGON
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions

1. On 26 September 1961 the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance submitted to the United States Intelligence Board a recommendation that the two ARGON missions scheduled for October 1961 be replaced by CORONA missions and that the ARGON missions be postponed. The Army and the Navy dissented from this view, as did their principals when the COMOR recommendation came before the Board and was approved.

2. The reasoning of the majority of the Committee on this question was that, while obtaining data to aid in the improvement of geodetic control is important, it was of more importance at that time to direct our efforts to acquire data bearing upon missile deployment. The need for missile deployment information was accentuated at that time by the existing international situation.

3. On the initiative of the Army and Navy, the COMOR has examined whether the situation is now such that it should recommend ARGON missions earlier than September and October 1962 as presently scheduled.

4. Since last September important information has been obtained on a number of critical targets and with the introduction of

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stereo and the frequency of missions projected for the remainder of 1962, we expect quality and quantity far exceeding the KH take to this date. The first stereo will go in February and at present two more are scheduled for April, two for May, and about three per month for the remainder of the year.

5. COMOR believes that the scheduled CORONA missions in February and April should not be interrupted. Thereafter, however, the scheduled frequency of the CORONA stereo missions suggest that the scheduling of ARGON missions in the months of May, June, or July would not seriously interfere with the continued acquisition of CORONA photography. At least a thirty-day interval between ARGON missions is desirable to permit preliminary evaluation of results. Whereas snow cover may improve in certain regards the ability to obtain information from CORONA photography, this is not true with regard to ARGON. By September and October snow cover may be expected to apply over a major portion of the area in which our need for accurate geodetic-controlled information is greatest.

6. Our judgment in urging the early acquisition of ARGON photography is motivated also by the fact that several months will be required to process completely and to get the full benefit from raw ARGON materials.

7. The COMOR recommends:

a. That after the stereo shots now

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scheduled for February and for April, one ARGON
shot be scheduled in May.

b. That scheduling of a second ARGON
mission be subject to review by COMOR in the light
of all relevant factors including the performance of
the first ARGON mission.

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COMOR General file

COMOR-D-48/2

13 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions

The attached draft is distributed for study by the members
prior to a COMOR meeting on the subject the week of 19 February.

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[Redacted]
James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject draft.

Copies 2, 3--State TCO

4--DIA [Redacted]

5, 6--DIA TCO

7--JCS via DIA

8, 9--OACSI TCO

10--ONI TCO

11, 12, 13--AFCIN TCO

14, 15 --NSA TCO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions

1. On 26 September 1961 the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance submitted to the United States Intelligence Board a recommendation that the two ARGON missions scheduled for October 1961 be replaced by CORONA missions and that the ARGON missions be postponed. The Army and the Navy dissented from this view, as did their principals when the COMOR recommendation came before the Board and was approved.

2. The reasoning of the majority of the Committee on this question was that, while obtaining data to aid in the improvement of geodetic control is important, it was of more importance at that time to direct our efforts to acquire data bearing upon missile deployment. The need for missile deployment information was accentuated at that time by the existing international situation.

3. On the initiative of the Army and Navy, the COMOR has examined whether the situation is now such that it should recommend ARGON missions earlier than September and October 1962 as presently scheduled.

4. Since last September important information has been obtained on a number of critical targets and with the introduction of

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stereo and the frequency of missions projected for the remainder of 1962, we expect quality and quantity far exceeding the KH take to this date. The first stereo will go in February and at present two more are scheduled for April, two for May, and about three per month for the remainder of the year.

5. COMOR believes that the scheduled CORONA missions in February and April should not be interrupted. Thereafter, however, the scheduled frequency of the CORONA stereo missions suggest that the scheduling of ARGON missions in the months of May, June, or July would not seriously interfere with the continued acquisition of CORONA photography. At least a thirty-day interval between ARGON missions is desirable to permit preliminary evaluation of results. Whereas snow cover may improve in certain regards the ability to obtain information from CORONA photography, this is not true with regard to ARGON. By September and October snow cover may be expected to apply over a major portion of the area in which our need for accurate geodetic-controlled information is greatest.

6. Our judgment in urging the early acquisition of ARGON photography is motivated also by the fact that several months will be required to process completely and to get the full benefit from raw ARGON materials.

7. The COMOR recommends:

a. That after the stereo shots now

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KEYHOLE SYSTEM

scheduled for February and for April, at least two ARGON shots be accomplished during the period of May, June, or July in lieu of the two now scheduled for October.

b. That scheduling of these missions be subject to review by COMOR in the light of continuing CORONA coverage and the international situation as well as ARGON performance.

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COMOR-D-48/1

26 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Scheduling of Satellite Photography

1. ARGON missions are scheduled for mid October and the end of October 1961.

2. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommends that the two missions now scheduled for ARGON in October be postponed and that in their place CORONA missions be scheduled. This view is based upon the needs of the United States in the current international crisis for intelligence bearing upon the operational deployment of ICBMs in the USSR.

3. The Army and the Navy representatives on COMOR dissent from the foregoing view and recommend that the ARGON schedule be continued as planned.

4. For the information of the Board, the COMOR has submitted requirements guidance to Operations in the eventuality that a decision is made that the CORONA missions shall be conducted.



[Redacted]
James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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7, 8, 9--AFCIN TCO ARGON
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[Redacted]
This paper has been scheduled for
USIB Thursday, September 7, for
executive session. I have informed
the Chairman, USIB, that the COMOR
representatives would brief their
USIB principals.



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Conor General file

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COMOR-D-47 48

5 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON Missions

1. The present schedule for CORONA and ARGON Missions
is as follows:

- a. CORONA C-Triple Prime--September 8.
 - b. CORONA C-Triple Prime--September 15.
 - c. ARGON--September 28.
 - d. CORONA C-Triple Prime--mid-October.
 - e. ARGON--late October.

2. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has weighed the relative importance at this time of obtaining CORONA-reconnaissance photography versus ARGON photo-mapping photography. It has confined its deliberation to whether a CORONA C-Triple Prime Mission should be substituted for an ARGON Mission on September 28 without prejudice to subsequent scheduling.

3. All members of COMOR except the Army believe that, while recognizing the importance of obtaining photo mapping to aid in the improvement of geodetic control, it is of first importance that we use our assets to acquire data bearing upon missile deployment. The needs in this regard are accentuated by the current international crisis, and missile deployment information could be highly critical for policy-makers in the near future.

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 ARGON



4. The Army calls attention to the long lead time required to exploit the product of ARGON for geodetic control purposes. It also notes based on our experience thus far with CORONA and ARGON that allowance must be made for failures in collection. Our margin of error in geodetic control, particularly but not exclusively in the interior of the USSR, is unacceptable and this must be reduced as rapidly as feasible. Even though the present proposal would mean a delay of only from two to three weeks, it is the Army fear that another postponement of an ARGON mission would be favorably considered on the next following missions for reasons similar to those advanced now for postponing the September 28th Mission.

5. Recommendation: The COMOR, with the exception of the Army, recommends that the ARGON Mission presently scheduled for September 28 be postponed^{until mid October} and that in its stead a CORONA Mission be substituted.

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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21-- C/DMD/NPIC
22-- DDP TCO
23-- Intel Staff/DPD
24-- SO/DPD
25-- USIB Secretariat
26-- USIB Secretariat
27-35-- C/SRS/DPD/DDP

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ARGON
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